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ABSTRACT 
 
Technical capabilities for improved communication, surveillance, and navigation (CNS) over the 
oceans are currently available. However, all aircraft operators will not equip simultaneously 
because of the high costs required. Consequently, as these CNS systems are integrated into 
oceanic air transportation architecture, the controller will have to manage the current low 
frequency surveillance and communication paths in parallel with future enhanced CNS.  The 
cognitive eﬀects of the mixed equipage environment were studied through field studies and 
experimental analysis.   
 
Field studies at New York Center, Oakland Center, and Reykjavik Center in Iceland were 
conducted to identify human-centered systems issues with the emerging mixed equipage 
environment. Findings show that the integration of varying communication latencies influences 
controller planning. The fusion of multiple surveillance sources and the application of varying 
separation standards based on equipage was found to limit the cognitive processes of the 
controller. These limitations may constrain the controller from providing full eﬃciency benefits 
to aircraft equipped with the highest capabilities, which would reduce the incentives for 
equipping.   
 
Experimental analysis was conducted to further study the integration of high and low frequency 
surveillance and the use of varying separation standards. Results show that workload increases 
and situation awareness degrades in the mixed surveillance environment, compared to segregated 
operations. The results also demonstrate that eﬃciency benefits attained by equipped aircraft are 
in fact limited in the mixed equipage environment.   
 
Implications for the design of air traﬃc control systems and procedures are also discussed. 
Strategies for the segregation of airspace based on equipage are suggested to alleviate controller 
cognitive limitations and ensure incentives for equipped aircraft.  Options are given for the 
display of equipage information in the future environment. 
 
 
 
This document is based on the thesis of Laura M. Major submitted to the Department of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Aeronautics and Astronautics. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the oceans, communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) is limited be-
cause aircraft are beyond line-of-sight range and there are limited tools to handle
them. However, the means for improved CNS through satellite-based technologies is
emerging. These technologies are dependent on onboard avionics capabilities. The
aircraft capabilities for the three CNS components are deﬁned as equipage. When
diﬀerences in CNS capabilities require the controller to treat the aircraft diﬀerently,
the situation is termed mixed equipage.
The CNS components are critical to air traﬃc control (ATC). Controller inter-
vention in an air traﬃc situation is enabled through surveillance and communication.
Surveillance allows the ground controller to monitor the environment and commu-
nication permits him/her to modify the air traﬃc situation. The navigation system
deﬁnes the precision of the route that can be ﬂown by an aircraft. A mixed equipage
problem arises because controller tasks for monitoring and issuing commands is signif-
icantly diﬀerent for aircraft with a heterogeneity in surveillance and communication
equipage. Also, diﬀerences in navigation equipment require varying separation min-
ima, based on the uncertainty in the aircraft route.
Opportunities for improved CNS are surfacing. The ATC system is being driven
forward by these opportunities, the demand for ATC improvements due to airspace
congestion, a growing focus on greater fuel eﬃciency, and a continued demand for
safety. However, there are inhibitors that limit many aircraft operators from equip-
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ping with the necessary onboard avionics equipage. The primary inhibitor is the cost
for equipping the current ﬂeet. Costs include the initial costs incurred from the pur-
chase of the avionics equipment, the installation and the certiﬁcation of the equipage,
as well as the recurring costs of crew training and maintaining the equipment [1].
The other limiting factors are the time required to remove the aircraft from use and
install the equipage and the anticipated beneﬁts to the users.
A mixed equipage environment is rapidly emerging in oceanic ATC. This is caused
by the recent availability of improved CNS systems and the numerous opportunities
for improvement upon the current oceanic ATC operations. For example, since air-
craft over the oceans are out of radar coverage, they are currently surveilled by the
pilot reporting aircraft position at speciﬁc waypoints, which typically occur once per
hour. These current CNS limitations require separation standards that are conserva-
tive compared with the domestic ATC environment. For example, lateral separation
minima over the North Atlantic is 60 nautical miles (nm), whereas it is 5 nm within
radar coverage over the United States. However, as equipage improves separation
standards can be reduced based on the upgrades.
Since there is a signiﬁcant gap in the diﬀerence between previous equipage and
future equipage in the oceanic ATC environment, oceanic ATC was chosen as the
focus for this thesis. The control of mixed equipage may increase controller workload
and degrade their understanding of how the situation is evolving. To address the
problem, this thesis examines the human factors and system risks of mixed equipage,
speciﬁcally in the oceanic environment, through a human-centered systems approach.
Possible solutions for future systems are also posed.
1.1 Motivation
There is substantial push to integrate new CNS technical capabilities into oceanic
ATC due to the need for reduced separation, which is driven by increased demand
and constraints on the desired routing over the oceans. These constraints result in
competition for speciﬁc airspace at certain times. Optimal airspace at desired time
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is requested to increase fuel eﬃciency and reduce delays. This overcrowding limits
ﬂexibility for handling perturbations in oceanic airspace (e.g., avoid turbulent weather
or emergency maneuvers).
Because of the procedural limitations, oceanic traﬃc was beginning to reach maxi-
mum allowable capacity within the desired airspace at peak times before the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. This resulted in many aircraft being forced to ﬂy
through turbulent conditions and making considerable deviations from optimal rout-
ings, which caused increases in fuel usage and delays. Since September 11, 2001 the
traﬃc load has decreased. However, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 2003
forecast predicts an annual growth rate of 4.2% for oceanic passenger traﬃc and 6.3%
for oceanic cargo traﬃc for the period of 2005 to 2014. [2]
Based on history of the implementation of new CNS systems, the time required
for any signiﬁcant change in ATC architecture can be substantial. Therefore, full
equipage cannot be assumed when designing future displays and procedures. This
means that as new aircraft equipage is integrated into the ATC system, controllers will
have the added responsibility of being aware of aircraft equipage and considering this
new attribute in their decision making. The purpose of the present study is to better
understand the controller cognitive implications of the mixed equipage environment.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Oceanic Air Traﬃc Control
The oceanic environment is a unique ATC domain. While there is a considerable
amount of available airspace, there is a narrow corridor of optimal airspace at desired
times between major continental areas. Factors inﬂuencing the optimal routings
include winds, fuel eﬃcient altitudes, and overﬂight fees for air services. Oceanic
winds, such as the jetstream, can signiﬁcantly eﬀect ﬂight times. In the northern
hemisphere, the jetstream is generally an easterly ﬂowing wind pattern with speeds
that sometimes exceed 250 miles per hour. Jetstream position changes everyday and
13
Figure 1-1: Jetstream position in the morning (left) and in the evening (right) for
September 2, 2004 [4]. The shaded region represents the strongest area of the jet-
stream and the arrows represent the direction of the winds. The comparison shows
the variability, even within a 24-hour period.
throughout the day as shown in Figure 1-1. The jetstream can decrease ﬂight time if
it is utilized when ﬂying in the same direction as the winds and avoided when ﬂying
against the winds [3].
The most desired route is also inﬂuenced by fuel eﬃciency, which is dependent
on the altitude ﬂown. Depending on the type of aircraft and the weight, there is a
speciﬁc optimal altitude. An example of the most fuel eﬃcient altitudes for a Boeing
757 is shown in Figure 1-2. The optimal altitude is highlighted along the diagonal,
indicating that as the weight decreases, the optimal altitude increases. During ﬂight,
aircraft weight decreases due to fuel burn, thus the optimal altitude slightly increases.
However, this is not accommodated by the current oceanic procedures. Consequently
oceanic ﬂights currently try to attain a ﬂight level that corresponds to their average
weight during the ﬂight.
Overﬂight fees also eﬀect the optimal routing. Routing optimization tries to min-
imize ﬂight time in airspace with expensive overﬂight fees. These fees vary depending
on the country responsible for the airspace. The United States is one of a few countries
that does not charge for overﬂight. An example of overﬂight fees are those charged
by Canada. In October, 2004 the fee for the provision of navigation services over
the North Atlantic was $97.12 per ﬂight and their fee for international air to ground
communication was $52.33 for position reporting using voice and $26.44 for using
14
Figure 1-2: Fuel burn table shows the optimal altitude, which is shaded, based on
aircraft weight. [4].
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Datalink, per ﬂight [5]. These constraints deﬁne a speciﬁc route that the majority of
oceanic traﬃc compete to ﬂy along, and currently only few aircraft receive. As CNS
enhancements are introduced, separation standards can be reduced and aircraft can
be more tightly packed on the optimal trajectory. Added available airspace in the
optimal region would provide for increased ﬂexibility, which would allow more ﬂight
plan changes during ﬂight.
1.3 Methodology
An integrated human centered systems approach (IHCSA) was applied to gather a
better understanding of the controllers’ cognitive activities, identify information ex-
changed, and determine how mixed and variable equipage will change the oceanic
ATC environment. The IHCSA combines traditional human factors techniques with
those used in systems engineering [6] . This approach is a practical technique for
evaluating ATC systems, in which the human is considered a functional component
of the closed-loop information system. The ﬁrst two steps of IHCSA are to model the
system and operator as a closed-loop feedback process and determine the information
requirements the operator needs to perform their tasks. Field studies at North At-
lantic and Paciﬁc Oceanic ATC facilities were conducted to accomplish these steps.
The ﬁndings are discussed in Chapter 3. Key human factors issues were identiﬁed
from these models and system level trends emerged.
A controller cognitive model, based on human-centered systems literature is dis-
cussed in chapter 4. The impact of mixed aircraft equipage on the controller cognitive
processes is also included in this chapter. The risks of the mixed equipage environ-
ment identiﬁed through the ﬁeld studies and modeling were further examined through
experimental studies, which are discussed in chapter 5. Implications for ATC were
developed based on the results. These can be found in chapter 6.
Before getting into the results from the IHCSA, a background of the current and
future technology trends in oceanic ATC is provided in chapter 2.
16
Chapter 2
Technology Trends
The challenges in oceanic CNS methods arise because aircraft are beyond the horizon.
The current methods used are described below. Satellites are providing the opportu-
nity for improved CNS over the oceans. While these changes alleviate the problems
with the current methods, they also introduce a mixed equipage environment, which
may create new problems. These satellite-based technologies will also be discussed.
2.1 Current Technology Trends
2.1.1 Communication
Very high frequency (VHF) radio is commonly used for air to ground communication
over land. But VHF is limited to line-of-sight range, which precludes its use for
oceanic traﬃc beyond the horizon. Currently, most oceanic communication is done
over high frequency (HF) radio. The HF radio signal propagates by reﬂecting between
the ionosphere and the earth’s surface, therefore it can be transmitted over long
distances. This capability also creates a signiﬁcant amount of background noise on
HF frequencies, since signals from around the globe can be received.
Originally HF radio had to be continuously monitored to retrieve incoming mes-
sages. The controller was not able to handle the role of monitoring HF radio, while
also performing the control task. Therefore, the functions were split and the role
17
Figure 2-1: Current Controller-Centered Control Loop for oceanic ATC. Communi-
cation is conducted over HF radio through a third party communication relay service.
Surveillance is conducted by pilot position reports, which are reported approximately
every hour.
of monitoring HF radio was delegated to a third party communication relay service.
The communication relay service transmitted all messages between ground controller
and the ﬂight deck. Despite improvements in HF radio, this process is still performed
today. The current control loop is shown in Figure 2-1. The controller and the
communication relay service communicate through electronic messaging or by phone.
This indirect method of communication has not basically changed since the 1940’s.
The most major change to this communication process has been a switch from Morse
code to voice communication [2].
The detailed current communication process is illustrated through a process dia-
gram in Figure 2-2. When a pilot wishes to communicate with ground control they
must ﬁrst give this command over HF radio. Since HF radio is unreliable, it can
take a considerable amount of time for the pilot to get through to the communication
relay service radio operator (RO). Once this step is completed the RO must conﬁrm
the received command and transcribe it into electronic format. The message is then
sent to the ground controller. Once received, the controller reviews the message and
determines a response. The time it takes the controller to determine a response to the
message varies depending on the situation. For example, if a nominal position report
is received, only a few seconds to review are typically required. If a complex pilot
request is received, the controller will need more time to determine if the request is
possible. The increase in time is due to the time it takes the controller to project the
18
Figure 2-2: The current communication process reveals the unnecessary tasks.
new situation and also the time required for communication and coordination with
other pilots or controllers of adjacent facilities if necessary.
Once a response is determined the controller nominally sends an electronic message
with their response to the RO. To contact the pilot, the RO ﬁrst SELCAL’s (selective
call system) the cockpit. SELCAL sends a signal through an HF link. The signal is
decoded and a chime is activated in the cockpit to alert the pilot to begin monitoring
their HF radio. When the chime is received the pilot turns up the volume on their
HF radio and the message is delivered. The pilot must then conﬁrm the message to
ensure it was accurately received.
The communication process reveals the numerous unnecessary administrative tasks
that must be completed for each communicated message. The future communication
process shown in Figure 2-4 shows how these steps are eliminated through the use of
Datalink. This process is discussed further in section 2.2.
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The time it takes between when the pilot or controller wants to communicate a
message to the other and when the message is received is deﬁned communication
latency. The communication latency varies using the current communication process.
Nominally it takes three to ﬁve minutes, however it can take up to thirty minutes.
The nominal latency is mostly due to the numerous steps required to deliver each
message. Longer latency can be due to diﬃculty getting through over HF radio,
increased controller or pilot workload, which may limit when they can address the
message, or diﬃculty in determining a response to the message.
2.1.2 Surveillance
Radar is used for most ATC surveillance over land. There are two types of radar
used: primary and secondary. Primary radar works by sending out an electromagnetic
signal. The presence of an aircraft is determined by receiving an echo of the signal oﬀ
of the aircraft. Distance is determined by the elapsed time between transmission of
the signal and reception of the echo. Directive antenna patterns are used to determine
direction. Secondary radars use an ampliﬁed return of the signal by the transponder
and can include other coded information such as aircraft ID, altitude, etc.
Since oceanic traﬃc is beyond line-of-sight range, the radar signal will not reach
the aircraft. Consequently, surveillance is currently dependent on communication
and navigation. Pilots determine their position using onboard navigation systems and
report this position at speciﬁc position reporting points to the ground controller, using
the above communication process. For example, over the North Atlantic, position
reports are required every ten degrees longitude, or approximately once an hour [7].
Currently, surveillance is limited by both the communication latency issue described
above and the accuracy of the navigation system.
Pilots have the responsibility of reporting their position at predetermined points.
If an aircraft does not report its position within three minutes of the expectation, the
position report is considered late and the controller must try to make contact with
the pilot to resolve the late report.
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2.1.3 Navigation
Traditionally, aircraft navigation over land has been reliant on ground-based radio
navigation systems. The most common is very high frequency omni-directional radio
range, or VOR, which transmits two signals. The signals are received by the aircraft
systems and used to determine position relative to the VOR. This position is then
displayed in the cockpit. While there is a movement towards GPS based navigation,
the current systems and procedures for ATC over land is based on radio navigation
systems.
Radio-based navigation cannot be used for oceanic traﬃc since it is out of line-
of-sight range. Historically inertial navigation system (INS) has been used. INS
determines current position based on a detection of movement relative to the given
starting position. Satellites present the opportunity for more accurate navigation
through global positioning system (GPS). Presently onboard navigation typically con-
sists of either INS and/or GPS. GPS is more accurate than INS at detecting aircraft
position. Over the oceans, GPS coverage is fairly consistent because there are no
structures such as buildings or trees to disrupt the GPS signal. GPS is not as reliable
in the Polar regions because was designed for moderate to low level altitudes.
Vertical navigation is based on the sensing of Barometric pressure. At low altitude
a unit increase in pressure corresponds to a small change in altitude. Due to the
exponential relationship between altitude and pressure, at high altitudes the same
unit change in pressure corresponds to a much greater change in altitude. Therefore
at high altitudes more precise pressure measurements are needed to reduce the error
in measured altitude.
2.2 Emerging Technology Trends
There are many oceanic ATC technologies surfacing to provide higher frequency com-
munication and surveillance and more accurate navigation. Many of these advance-
ments are based on the application of satellite-based technologies. The emerging
controller-centered control loop is shown in Figure 2-3. Ground systems are also
21
Figure 2-3: Future Controller-Centered Control Loop will consist of direct commu-
nication and surveillance through satellite communication and ADS-A. Surveillance
information about surrounding aircraft will also be available to the ﬂight crew via
ADS-B.
adapting to receive and display the information provided by these technologies. Since
there will be a signiﬁcant shift in oceanic ATC operations, there is a unique oppor-
tunity to make substantial changes in the ATC systems.
2.2.1 Communication
Future communication will consist of a direct link between the ground controller and
the ﬂight deck. Satellites are providing the opportunity for direct voice and data
communications. Datalink, also referred to as CPDLC (controller pilot Datalink),
provides the means for data transmission between the ground and the ﬂight deck.
CPDLC has emerged as the primary means of oceanic communication for equipped
aircraft since its introduction at Oakland Center in 1995 and New York Center in
2003 [2]. Figure 2-4 illustrates the reduction in the number of tasks required to com-
municate a message using Datalink, as compared to HF radio. This reduction in tasks
results in fewer opportunities for human error. The use of data communication also
eliminates language barriers that can occur at oceanic facilities. The improvements
in the communication process using Datalink was demonstrated in a study of current
Datalink and HF radio operations. As expected, the results revealed that it takes less
time for Datalink transactions than transactions over HF voice [8].
Voice communication is also available through SATCOM. The use of SATCOM is
reserved for critical communication messages because there is a high cost associated
with each minute of communication. The cost of SATCOM is typically based on the
use of geosynchronized satellites. As other satellite systems are available this cost is
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Figure 2-4: The future communication process using Datalink shows the reduction in
the unnecessary tasks.
expected to go down. HF voice usually serves as a back-up to the satellite capabilities.
In a survey on future means of oceanic communication, 235 oceanic pilots were
asked to rank their preferred mode of communication (HF radio, CPDLC, or SAT-
COM) in various situations. Most of the pilots selected CPDLC for frequent commu-
nications that can be done with standardized messages, such as reporting position,
requesting clearances, and receiving clearances. For emergency situations and dialog
or negotiation discussions, SATCOM was chosen most frequently. [9] This study re-
veals that there is a need for voice communication. In fact, as separation minima are
reduced, the need for negotiation discussions will likely increase, making the need for
voice communication more critical.
Inter-facility communication is also evolving to incorporate electronic messaging
through air traﬃc services inter-facility data communications (AIDC). AIDC will
reduce the problems associated with language barriers between international facilities.
It is currently available on a limited basis and there are plans for including more
facilities in the near future.
2.2.2 Surveillance
Future oceanic surveillance will continue to be dependent on the aircraft’s onboard
navigation and communication equipage. The communication advancements de-
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scribed above are providing the opportunity for more frequent and reliable position
reports, through enhanced communication. Automatic dependent surveillance (ADS)
will introduce a more revolutionary oceanic surveillance concept. ADS allows for au-
tomatic reporting of ﬂight information such as position, velocity, altitude, heading
and identiﬁcation. The reports are based on the onboard GPS navigation system.
ADS comes in two forms: ADS-A (address) and ADS-B (broadcast).
2.2.3 ADS-A
ADS-A1 automatically sends ﬂight information through a satellite communication
link to speciﬁed addressees (typically ATC ground stations) at speciﬁed intervals,
determined by contracts. This reduces unnecessary pilot workload by taking the
pilot out of the surveillance loop. It also reduces controller administrative tasks by
displaying this information to the controller directly. The controller will no longer
need to process each report individually.
ADS-A reports are limited by economics because there is a signiﬁcant cost associ-
ated with each report obtained. The current operations manual for the South Paciﬁc
speciﬁes that reporting frequency should not exceed once per ﬁve minutes [10]. ADS-
A is currently not available as stand-alone equipment; it is sold as a part of the
FANS-1/A package, which includes CPDLC. The nonrecurring average avionics cost
to equip an aircraft with FANS-1/A is estimated to be $560-620K in 1998 dollars [11].
The cost includes the FANS-1/A package with CPDLC, but excludes GPS. A major
portion of this cost comes from the pilot interface and integrating the communication
system with the aircraft’s current navigation and ﬂight control systems.
2.2.4 ADS-B
ADS-B automatically broadcasts ﬂight information at speciﬁed intervals and sur-
rounding “listeners” within a certain range (typically 200 nm) can pick up the infor-
mation. The “listeners” in the oceanic environment refer to surrounding aircraft, but
1ADS-A is referred to as ADS-C (contract) in Europe.
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in domestic ATC ground receivers can also pick up the broadcasted ﬂight informa-
tion. ADS-B provides the ﬂight crew with information about surrounding aircraft,
increasing their situation awareness. This introduces the opportunity for some level
of self separation by the ﬂight deck. However, future operations utilizing ADS-B are
still being debated. A brief review of previous human factors studies of ADS-B oper-
ations is included in Appendix A. An example of the nonrecurring cost of equipping
an aircraft with ADS-B in 1998 dollars is estimated to be $25-35K in the high range
and $5-7K in the low range [11]. This is only a preliminary estimate since there are
still many unknowns.
2.2.5 Navigation
While most aircraft are currently equipped with GPS and have back-up INS capabil-
ities, it is predicted that all aircraft will be equipped with GPS/Galileo navigation
systems within 15 years [2]. Currently there are issues with the integrity of GPS.
However, as more satellite systems are introduced, integrity issues will be reduced.
There have been improvements in vertical navigation due to requirements for
reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM). The objective of the requirements is
to reduce the total error in measured altitude. This includes improvements in the
accuracy of barometric pressure sensing in the air data computer and calibration of
the pressure measurement system. RVSM will be discussed further in the following
section.
2.2.6 Performance-Based Separation Standards
ATC improvements are dependent on CNS upgrades. However these upgrades can-
not occur without industry investment in avionics equipage. Investment decisions are
made based on beneﬁts to the user, which are obtained through improved ATC op-
erations. This challenge cannot be alleviated without providing beneﬁts to equipped
aircraft immediately. In the oceanic environment, in order to provide ﬂexibility and
optimal routings to equipped aircraft, the minimum allowable separation needs to be
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reduced. To do this, separation minima must be based on aircraft equipage.
One of the ﬁrst programs to introduce the concept of diﬀerential separation stan-
dards based on CNS equipage is RVSM over the oceans. Vertical separation is reduced
for aircraft with improved navigation systems from 2000 feet to 1000 feet, between
29,000 feet and 41,000 feet, or ﬂight levels (FL) 290 and 410. More speciﬁcally, RVSM
aircraft must be equipped with redundant altitude measurement systems, altitude re-
porting transponder, altitude alerting system, and automatic altitude control system
[12]. RVSM was ﬁrst implemented in the North Atlantic in 1997 and in WATRS
and the Paciﬁc in 2000. Approximately 98% of aircraft that ﬂy over the oceans are
equipped for RVSM.
Prior to RVSM, minimum navigation performance (MNPS) was integrated into
the North Atlantic airspace. MNPS is deﬁned for airspace between FL 285 and 410.
Within this airspace, all aircraft must be equipped with two long-range navigation
systems (LRNSs) which must continuously display an indication of the aircraft posi-
tion relative to the desired track [13]. The LRNSs may be any two of the following:
INS, GPS, or another navigation system that complies with the MNPS requirements.
A shift in the criteria for separation assurance has occurred since the introduction
of improved altimetry systems was introduced. The criteria metrics have transitioned
from speciﬁc equipage to aircraft performance. Under this concept, regulatory agen-
cies can give aircraft operators the freedom to choose their preferred avionics equipage
that meets the performance requirement. These performance criteria can be applied
to any airspace region and be used to deﬁne separation standards. This is captured
in a model known as required total system performance (RTSP), which establishes
a standard set of performance component metrics [14]. The performance metrics
represent each of the CNS components. The three metrics are deﬁned as required
communication performance (RCP), required navigation performance (RNP), and
required surveillance performance (RSP). Every aircraft’s total system performance
can be deﬁned on this 3D Cartesian coordinate system, which is illustrated in Figure
2-5.
The RNP concept is presently used in the Paciﬁc airspace. The RNP speciﬁcation
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Figure 2-5: Required Total System Performance Model deﬁnes 3 axes by which air-
craft performance can be measured.
Figure 2-6: Currently RVSM is active in the North Atlantic and Paciﬁc and RHSM
for RNP-10 certiﬁed aircraft is active in the North Paciﬁc.
requires aircraft maintain a cross-track and along-track navigational accuracy error
within the deﬁned bounds, 95% of the time [15]. Under RNP rules aircraft must also
be equipped with an onboard system to automatically alert the crew if the navigation
system is no longer capable of maintaining the speciﬁed accuracy. RNP-10 is currently
implemented in the Paciﬁc airspace. Reduced horizontal separation minima (RHSM)
from 100 nm to 50 nm is active for aircraft that are RNP-10 certiﬁed.
The current state of improved procedures based on performance is shown in Figure
2-6. RVSM is active in most oceanic airspace and RHSM is active in the Paciﬁc, in
certain airspace regions.
Future FAA plans follow the trend for performance-based separation standards.
According to the FAA oceanic Strategic Plans for reduced separation, the require-
27
Separation
Minima RCP RNP RSP
50 nm lat. HF voice, enhanced RNP-10 60 min. position reports
comm in some areas
50 nm long. Direct voice or RNP-10 30 min. position reports
(limited) Datalink
50 nm long. Direct voice or RNP-10 ADS-A with distance
(extended) Datalink veriﬁcation at 30 min. intervals
30 nm lat. Direct voice or RNP-4 ADS-A with conformance
Datalink monitoring/detection
30 nm long. Direct voice or RNP-4 ADS-A with conformance monitoring
Datalink & 21.5 min. automated distance verif.
Table 2.1: Future FAA oceanic plans to reduce separation match the RTSP concept.
The aircraft requirements can be separated into CNS performance categories [12]. As
RTSP requirements increase the separation minima decrease.
ments for reduced separation can be categorized into one of the three RTSP com-
ponents [12]. Currently the communication and surveillance criteria specify required
equipage instead of performance, although this may change in the future as more
avionics equipage options become available. The FAA plans are ﬁt to the RTSP
model in Table 2.1.
Long term plans are illustrated in Figure 2-7. The ﬁrst step, included in the above
Table is to move towards 30 nm lateral and longitudinal separation in the North
Atlantic by 2006 and in the Paciﬁc in proceeding years. Then horizontal separation
in the North Atlantic is planned to be reduced further to 15 nm. There are also
plans to implement a new oceanic ATC ground system in the U.S. facilities. The new
system was integrated into the facilities on a limited basis for testing and training at
Oakland Center in June, 2004. This new system will be discussed in the next chapter.
2.3 Conclusions
Signiﬁcant CNS improvements are currently available. Direct communication is avail-
able by Datalink and SATCOM. ADS-A introduces high frequency automatic posi-
tion reporting. And navigation improvements are available based on GPS. These
improvements provide the opportunity to bring the aircraft closer together. Separa-
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Figure 2-7: Future state of oceanic procedures, based on the FAA plans. The im-
provements from the current state, which are bold faced, are expected beyond 2007.
tion reductions are possible because the controller will have a signiﬁcantly improved
ability to intervene in the air traﬃc situation. Also, navigation improvements allow
the pilot to more precisely specify their route or trajectory. Reduced separation is
needed in oceanic ATC because currently aircraft are required to ﬂy non-optimal
routes, which increases fuel usage and delays. Also, ﬂexibility is severely limited,
which compromises safety by forcing aircraft to ﬂy through turbulent conditions.
Aircraft operators must be incentivized to attain the equipage to drive the ATC
system forward. In order to incentivize aircraft operators to purchase the improved
equipage, there must be an immediate return on investment. This is challenging
to oﬀer since the aircraft with limited CNS must also be serviced. Mixed equipage
problems experienced today, with limited variations in equipage, will be discussed in
the following chapter. Then in chapter 4 and 5, the issues associated with integrating
future equipage will be discussed.
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Chapter 3
Field Studies
Field studies were conducted to understand the current oceanic ATC system and
identify emerging mixed equipage issues. This contextual study was required because
of the complexities of the mixed equipage problem. Key issues can be identiﬁed only
through observation of the controller within the control environment. Once identiﬁed,
issues were studied further through modeling and controller experimental studies.
3.1 Objectives
In order to gather a better understanding of oceanic ATC operations and the impact
mixed equipage will have on this environment, ﬁeld studies were conducted at vari-
ous facilities that control air traﬃc over both the Atlantic and Paciﬁc Oceans. These
included Reykjavik Center in Iceland, New York Center, and Oakland Center. The
observations were focused on gathering operational data on key human-centered sys-
tems issues with the current and future mixed equipage environments and gathering
controller insight.
3.2 Methodology
Prior to the site visits, an observation plan was developed, shown in Table 3.1. The
plan consists of the following categories: goals, process analysis, plan, situation aware-
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Probe Type Probe Objective
Processes Process for handling nominal, abnormal, and
emergency situations
Goals Controller’s actual goals, means for achieving
goals, goal to situation matching
Situation Method for gaining awareness, use of ﬂight strips,
Awareness other useful tools, cognitive view of the world vs. actual
view
Workload Workload constraints, method in which the controller
stay within their workload capacity, assistance of other
controllers to remain in their capacity
Plan Formulation of plans, plan ﬂexibility for pilot requests
Communication Eﬀectiveness of the current communication system
between the controller and pilot/comm. relay service and
between controllers, suggestions for ﬁxing breakdowns
Information Most useful pieces of information, suggestions
information that could be useful
Table 3.1: Observation plan developed to guide the site visit observations.
ness, workload, communication, and information. Within each of these categories
speciﬁc probes were developed based on the controller cognitive model to guide the
observations and conversations with the controllers.
3.3 Current General ATC Operations
There are signiﬁcant commonalities between the oceanic facilities observed, which
were identiﬁed through the ﬁeld studies. Most oceanic ATC follows a procedural
process. Aircraft are procedurally designated a ﬂight plan, that provides a path from
entry into oceanic airspace to exit, which does not interact with other aircraft or
reserved airspace regions.
The primary task of the controller is to monitor these procedurally planned ﬂight
paths at each position reporting point, or waypoint, and at the sector entry and exit
points. Controllers are mainly concerned with ensuring adequate longitudinal and
vertical separation. Lateral separation is provided by the oceanic track structure, to
which most of the North Atlantic and part of the Paciﬁc traﬃc conforms. The tracks
are spaced according to the minimum allowable lateral separation and have minimal
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Figure 3-1: Eastbound North Atlantic track structure, the circles represent the posi-
tion reporting points along each track.
crossings to reduce the four-dimensional problem space to two-dimensions, time at
waypoint and vertical separation. The tracks are negotiated by the Centers daily
based on wind information and forecasted traﬃc. An example of eastbound tracks
across the North Atlantic is shown in Figure 3-1. The position reporting points are
shown as triangles along the tracks, every 10◦ of longitude. The airspace structure
ensures safety despite the high frequency of communication failures, which also result
in a lack of surveillance.
Flight strips, in paper or electronic form, are used to monitor progression along
the track structure. The ﬂight strip organization corresponds to the track structure.
The controllers are provided with a ﬂight strip or marking on the strip for each posi-
tion reporting point, which allows them to monitor longitudinal and vertical position
at each of the reporting points. Longitudinal separation is currently given as a tem-
poral restriction (e.g., 10 minutes in trail). In order to ensure adequate longitudinal
separation the controllers manually compare an aircraft’s time at each waypoint with
other aircraft that also pass through these points.
3.4 Generic Information Flow
Based on the ﬁeld studies, a general information ﬂow diagram, shown in Figure 3-2,
was developed to identify the agents in the control loop and information requirements
for the controller. The agents, shown in bold, rounded rectangles, include Controllers
both within and outside of the facility, Pilot, Radio Operator at the Communication
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Figure 3-2: General information ﬂow for current oceanic facilities (based on New York
Center, Oakland Center, and Reykjavik Center)
Relay Service, and the Dispatcher at the Airline Operations Center (AOC). The ob-
served oceanic workstations varied across the facilities. However, they all contain the
following elements: Communication, which may usually includes voice and Datalink
communications, Information Display (e.g., ﬂight strips), Situation Display, and other
Miscellaneous information (e.g., maps, notes from supervisor, etc).
3.4.1 Flight Data Server
The Flight Data Server is the central database for all electronic ﬂight information.
Flight plans for all aircraft that enter the airspace region controlled by the facility are
originally put into the ﬂight data server by the Dispatcher at the AOC. This ﬂight
plan is then updated by position reports that are received electronically, through
Datalink, radar, ADS-A, or electronic messages from the Radio Operator. Controllers
also update the Flight Data Server based on Voice Communication with the Pilot,
Radio Operator, Dispatcher, or other Controllers. The information on the spatial
Situation Display and ﬂight strips is retrieved from the Flight Data Server.
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3.4.2 Interface and Conﬂict Alerts
The controller interface consists of the spatial Situation Display, a display of elec-
tronic messages (from both the radio operator and pilots), and ﬂight strips. If radar
information is available, another spatial display of this information may also be in-
cluded. At each facility, there are conﬂict probes. These probes search for conﬂicts
based on the constraints identiﬁed by the facility and alert the controller when they
are identiﬁed. The constraints may include deviations from expected position, antic-
ipated violation of separation standards or other procedures, missed position reports,
etc. The alerts may appear on the spatial situation display, electronic ﬂight strips, or
display of electronic messages.
3.4.3 Information Exchanged Between Agents
A controller communicates with pilots through a third party communication relay
service. Position report information is currently the primary information exchanged
between pilots and controllers. Position report information consists of a current
position (lat./long. point and ﬂight level), Mach number, and time at the next two
reporting points.
A position report that is greater than three minutes past the expected arrival time
is considered late and must be resolved. First the controller attempts to make contact
through the radio operator. If the radio operator is unable to reach the pilot through
HF radio, then the controller will attempt to call the cockpit using SATCOM, if the
aircraft is equipped. If a position report cannot be resolved within thirty minutes
then the supervisor is alerted and further action is taken. This may include asking
other nearby aircraft to contact the “missing” aircraft over VHF.
Pilots make requests for changes to their ﬂight plan or additional information
through the communication relay service. Oceanic controllers reported that the most
frequent requests are for ﬂight level changes, typically to a higher altitude. Another
common request that was observed was slight oﬀ-track deviations to avoid turbu-
lent situations. Additional information requested from the controller may include
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information on winds, delays, and restrictions at adjacent Centers.
Communication between controllers within the facility is exchanged either over
phone or face-to-face. Information between facilities is exchanged through either
phone or electronic messages (when available). Controllers answer the phone and
look at the messages in the order that they receive them, which allows for urgent
messages to get lost in the pile. Typically, phone calls are attended to more rapidly
than electronic messages.
Currently, most communication with other controllers both inside and outside
the Center occurs during hand-oﬀs. Information exchanged during hand-oﬀs includes
aircraft time at sector boundary, Mach number, cruise altitude, and cleared route.
Typically, oceanic controllers need to contact the controller responsible for the adja-
cent sector that an aircraft will be entering approximately thirty minutes prior to the
hand-oﬀ, to alert them of the entering aircraft. After this information is exchanged,
the controller may need to amend the hand-oﬀ information if the pilot asks for changes
before crossing the sector boundary. The controller then contacts the adjacent sector
or facility again when the aircraft has exited the airspace that he/she is responsible
for. Other communication is typically for clariﬁcation on an aircraft route, speed, or
altitude for an aircraft in an adjacent sector or sector restrictions, such as the number
of aircraft they will accept.
Communication between the ATC Center and the airlines is done through the
AOC dispatcher. Initially the airline ﬁles a ﬂight plan through an integrated network,
such as the North American data integrated network (NADIN). The dispatcher sends
the ﬂight plan to necessary facilities, which gets entered into the Flight Data Server.
Once the ﬂight plan is in the Flight Data Server it will automatically be shown on
ﬂight strips and on the situation display.
3.4.4 Direct Surveillance Information
Other surveillance information is available on a limited basis. Radar coverage is avail-
able in oceanic transition areas as well as near islands, such as Iceland and Greenland
in the North Atlantic, and Hawaii and Guam in the Paciﬁc. Aircraft equipped with
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FANS-1/A have the capability of sending automatic surveillance updates. Currently
most workstations, including those in the U.S. and Iceland, are not capable of receiv-
ing this information. The next generation workstation in most regions will be able to
accept ADS-A information.
The individual elements of the information ﬂow vary across facilities. The speciﬁcs
at Reykjavik Center in Iceland, New York Center, and Oakland Center and observa-
tions at these facilities will now be discussed.
3.5 Reykjavik Center Observations
The Reykjavik site visit consisted of four hour observations on four separate days.
During the visit, thirteen controllers (ﬁve in non-radar sectors and eight in sectors
with partial radar coverage), a chief controller, a supervisor, and a training instructor
were observed and interviewed.
3.5.1 Overview of Facility
The airspace controlled by Reykjavik Center is illustrated in Figure 3-3. The NAT
tracks occasionally pass through the Reykjavik airspace. Reykjavik Center also han-
dles a portion of the Polar tracks. The majority of the Reykjavik Center’s southeast
airspace is covered by radar, as shown in Figure 3-4. This section of airspace is also
mostly covered by VHF communication, which provides more reliable, direct con-
troller to pilot voice communication. This provides a good case for looking at the
issues that will be faced in the future non-radar sectors as enhanced communication
and surveillance become more prevalent.
In April 2002, Reykjavik Center switched from the use of paper ﬂight strips to a
ﬂight data processing system (FDPS). A non-radar workstation is shown in Figure
3-5. FDPS consists of electronic ﬂight strips and a spatial situation display. This
system provides the opportunity for decision support and other display features to
be integrated into the controller workstation. The electronic ﬂight strips, shown in
Figure 3-6, are grouped by altitude. An expected time at every position reporting
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Figure 3-3: Airspace controlled by Reykjavik Center handles some traﬃc on the North
Atlantic tracks and a portion of the Polar tracks [16].
Figure 3-4: Radar coverage in Reykjavik Center airspace is circled. Some oceanic
traﬃc passes through this airspace, in which the separation is reduced from 60 nm to
5 nm [16].
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Figure 3-5: The Reykjavik controller workstation consists of electronic ﬂight strips,
in front of the controller and a situation display, to the left of the controller.
point is included on each strip. The left to right order of the time at position reports
matches the actual west to east location of the waypoints. This organization enables
quick comparison of strips to determine if there is adequate time between aircraft at
each waypoint, within each altitude.
3.5.2 Detailed Observations
Facility Technologies
Reykjavik controllers reported that the electronic strips are much easier to use than
the paper strips. All of the tasks associated with manually inserting and removing the
paper strips into the proper location is eliminated with the electronic format. They
also reported that the Situation Display provides the means for a quick reference
check on the air traﬃc situation, which makes understanding the state of the air
traﬃc situation when ﬁrst beginning a shift is easier.
While FDPS was generally accepted by the controllers, there were a consider-
able amount of false alarms created by the conﬂict probes. During the observations
more than three false alarms were issued to each controller observed. Most of the
warnings were conﬂict warnings on the situation display. There were also coordina-
tion warnings. The controllers reported that many of these warnings occur because
the conﬂict probe does not take the reduced separation due to radar coverage into
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Figure 3-6: Electronic ﬂight strips used at Reykjavik Center are grouped by ﬂight
level and ordered left to right by position reporting points.
Figure 3-7: Equipage information is located on the ﬂight strip. This aircraft is
equipped for MNPS (“X”) and RVSM (“W”).
account. Future versions of the FDPS are planned to improve on conﬂict detection.
Mixed Equipage Issues
In order to inform the controller of RVSM and MNPS status, the navigation equipage
information is located on the ﬂight strip. In Reykjavik Center there is a letter des-
ignator for each equipage type, which is shown in Figure 3-7. There is an “X” if an
aircraft is equipped for MNPS and a “W” if an aircraft is equipped for RVSM.
An analogy to mixed equipage was observed at Reykjavik Center in the sectors
that had partial radar coverage. Rather than CNS improvements due to onboard
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Figure 3-8: Reykjavik Center workstation in a sector with limited radar coverage.
The screen on the left is the situation display. The second screen from the left and
the screen on the far right display radar information, two screens are provided so that
the controller can see an overview of the traﬃc and zoom in on a conﬂict at the same
time.
avionics equipage, radar and VHF availability based on geographic location provides
signiﬁcantly enhanced ATC operations. The current workstations for these sectors
consists of three spatial displays of the traﬃc, two of them are radar displays (one
shows a global view and one is used to zoom in on a situation) and the other is
the situation display described above. One of these workstations is shown in Figure
3-8. This workstation conﬁguration requires the controller to manually integrate the
nearly continuously updated radar information with the projected information shown
on the situation display. This process constrains the tasks of the controller.
The limited radar coverage also provided an opportunity to observe the impact of
transitioning boundaries from an area of increased separation to an area of reduced
separation. Within the area of radar coverage the longitudinal separation is reduced
from 10 minutes to 3 minutes, as illustrated in Figure 3-9. Since oceanic traﬃc
entered the radar coverage separated by 10 minutes and needed to leave the radar
coverage with this conservative non-radar separation, the controllers did not utilize
the reduced radar separation for the majority of the traﬃc. There were a few situation
during which the controllers applied separation reduced below the oceanic standards.
The commonality between the situations where separation was reduced was that
the aircraft regained oceanic separation before leaving the radar coverage without
controller intervention. In one observed instance, an aircraft on the NAT tracks and
another that crossed the NAT tracks on a Polar track were allowed to come within 5
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Figure 3-9: Example of the issue of transitioning boundaries from Reykjavik Center.
Radar coverage allows longitudinal separation to be reduced from 10 minutes to 3
minutes, however the track traﬃc does not beneﬁt from this reduction.
minutes of each other within the radar region. The two aircraft resumed 10 minute
separation soon after crossing.
Other Observations
Several communication and surveillance problems were observed at Reykjavik. There
were several missed or late position reports. A position report 3 minutes past the ex-
pected time or more is considered late. Also, an aircraft lost HF radio communication
during the site visit. The controller reported that the protocol for problems with HF
radio is to issue the oceanic clearance while the aircraft is still within VHF coverage
and then assume that the aircraft will stay on its path, according to the ﬂight plan.
3.6 New York Center Observations
During the site visit at New York Center three observations were performed for four
hours each. Two of the observations were during the day and one was during the
night. Of the eleven controllers observed, three were in North Atlantic radar sectors,
nine were in North Atlantic non-radar sectors, and eight were in WATRS non-radar
sectors. Three supervisors were observed. In addition an ATOP specialist gave a tour
of the ATOP simulators.
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Figure 3-10: New York Center is responsible for North Atlantic traﬃc from the U.S.
coast to 40W, which consists of the NAT tracks and WATRS routes [17].
3.6.1 Overview of Facility
Oceanic airspace controlled by New York Center is shaded in Figure 3-10. The north-
ern part of the airspace consists of the southwestern half of the north Atlantic track
system (NAT) and the southwestern part of the airspace consists of the northern
portion of the west Atlantic route system (WATRS). NAT traﬃc is comprised mainly
of traﬃc between Europe and the U.S. WATRS airspace is a unique non-radar envi-
ronment that consists of a complex web of crossing ﬁxed routes, primarily between
the east coast of the U.S. and the Caribbean islands. The WATRS routes are shown
in Figure 3-11.
The workstations used in the U.S. oceanic sectors consist of paper ﬂight strips
and the oceanic display and planning system (ODAPS). The controllers primarily
use the ﬂight strips for their separation tasks. ODAPS is composed of electronic
messages, both Datalink and messages from the third party communication relay
service (ARINC), and a spatial situation display.
The organization of the U.S. paper ﬂight strips provides the temporal display
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Figure 3-11: The dense, crossing routes ﬂown in WATRS [17].
Figure 3-12: The primary means of control for the New York and Oakland Cen-
ter controllers is paper ﬂight strips (right). A situation display is also available for
reference (left).
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Figure 3-13: Paper ﬂight strips at New York Center are ﬁrst organized vertically
by time and then by altitude. Horizontally there is a copy of each strip in each
longitudinal position it passes through.
that is needed for meeting the longitudinal separation. As shown in Figure 3-13,
the columns represent the position reporting points or other critical points, such as
crossing traﬃc. Within these columns the strips are arranged by time, with the
next strip at that waypoint on the bottom. This allows the controller to ensure that
multiple aircraft will not arrive at the same point at the same time (or within the
designated separation minima).
The future U.S. workstation, the advanced technologies and oceanic procedures
(ATOP), shown in Figure 3-14, is being developed and planned for implementation in
2005. ATOP consists of electronic ﬂight strips and an improved situation display. The
plans for this workstation include using the spatial display as the primary means of
separation. All available radar information, ADS-A, and position report information
will be integrated and displayed on the situation display. Further decision support
tools for identifying and resolving conﬂicts are also planned for future workstations.
ATOP is currently used at Oakland Center on a limited basis and simulators for
training are installed at New York Center.
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Figure 3-14: ATOP is the future oceanic ATC workstation scheduled to replace
ODAPS in the U.S. facilities in 2004 and 2005.
3.6.2 Detailed Observations
Facility Technologies
ODAPS is fully integrated into all NAT sector workstations. The Situation Display
provides the controller with a spatial representation of the traﬃc situation display.
ODAPS was not however fully integrated into the WATRS sectors because of
controller resistance. The sector controllers use paper ﬂight strips, sector maps, and
print-outs of ARINC messages only. There is an additional workstation added to
the WATRS area to monitor ODAPS for conﬂict alerts and electronic messages and
ensure that they are being attended to by the sector controllers. Without the situation
display, sector controllers have to plot out close crossing or merging traﬃc on the
sector map with a grease pencil to determine if there is adequate separation. Figure
3-15 shows a picture of one of the erasable maps used at Oakland Center, pictures of
the map were not allowed at New York Center. The ruler used to draw the routing
and measure the spatial separation is shown in the bottom right corner. This process
is imprecise. For example, the controllers reported that the grease pencil line is
approximately 8 nm in width on their sector map.
The controllers reported that ODAPS does not account for RVSM. Therefore a
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Figure 3-15: Erasable map used to plot out routings to determine separation for
crossing or merging traﬃc.
Figure 3-16: Equipage information is shown using a one-letter designator on the ﬂight
strip in the U.S. facilities. This aircraft is equipped for RVSM and RNP-10 (“Q”).
false alarm is produced by the conﬂict probe for RVSM aircraft that are separated
by less than 2000 feet.
Mixed Equipage Issues
Since RVSM is applied to NAT and WATRS traﬃc navigation equipage information
is displayed on the paper ﬂight strips, illustrated in Figure 3-16. There is a one-letter
designator for the equipage; “W” represents RVSM certiﬁcation, “R” represents RNP-
10, and “Q” represents RVSM and RNP-10.
Datalink capability is indicated on the display that contains electronic messaging.
This will be discussed further during the observations at Oakland Center.
47
Other Observations
The New York controllers reported that their job consists mostly of reactive tasks.
They spend a signiﬁcant amount of time waiting for new information, such as pilot
position reports or pilot requests. Also, since they primarily use paper ﬂight strips,
there is no means of alerting them to overdue position reports, so they must manually
monitor for them.
The controllers were observed to spend a considerable amount of time updating
their ﬂight strip bays. This included removing outdated strips, adding in new strips,
and assuring that current strips were in the correct position. The electronic ﬂight
strips provided by ATOP will remove these tedious tasks.
3.7 Oakland Center Observations
At Oakland Center, three days of observations were conducted. During the visit nine
sector controllers were observed. Four of the controllers were controlling in South
Paciﬁc non-radar sectors and ﬁve were controlling in the North Paciﬁc non-radar
sectors. A controller in the traﬃc management unit (TMU) was also observed in
order to understand the planning tools.
3.7.1 Overview of Facility
Oakland Center controls most of the non-radar airspace in the Paciﬁc, which is demon-
strated in Figure 3-17. Traﬃc in the Paciﬁc is much less dense, but the ﬂights are
usually longer, which makes receiving optimal routing critical. For this reason, ATC
initiatives such as RHSM based on aircraft navigation performance (RNP) and im-
plementation of conﬂict probes have emerged ﬁrst in the Paciﬁc airspace.
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Figure 3-17: Oakland airspace extends over most of the Paciﬁc Ocean. [17]
3.7.2 Detailed Observations
Facility Technologies
ODAPS was fully accepted by the controllers at Oakland Center. The situation
display is particularly helpful in the Paciﬁc airspace because the routes ﬂown are not
always parallel like the NAT tracks. The spatial display allows the controllers to more
easily determine lateral separation.
Several inconsistency alerts generated by ODAPS were observed at Oakland Cen-
ter. These inconsistencies occured during data input because ODAPS cannot receive
diﬀerent forms of the same message. One of the alerts observed occurred because
position information for an aircraft with an ID of XX081 was entered by the radio
operator as XX81. ODAPS generated an error and did not update the ﬂight infor-
mation on the situation display. This created an inconsistency in the traﬃc situation
displayed on ODAPS and the information on the ﬂight strips. The controller manu-
ally notates changes directly on the strips. Therefore information on the strips is more
accurate since the controller is ﬂexible and can adapt the received messages to the
form he/she needs them in. The observed poor data quality of the situation display
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Figure 3-18: Communication window contains a list of aircraft within the sector.
Aircraft equipped with Datalink have a “+” next to their aircraft ID. Controllers
click on any aircraft ID to send an electronic message.
resulted in very little trust by the controllers in the system. They were observed to
only refer to the situation display when workload was low, to relieve boredom. Once
improvements are made to the data input quality for ATOP, controller trust in the
situation display is expected to increase.
Mixed Equipage Issues
At Oakland, there was a higher percentage of traﬃc equipped with Datalink. The
controllers were shown a list of all the aircraft in their sector. To send an electronic
message they clicked on that aircraft’s ID. An illustration of this list is shown in Figure
3-18. However, not all of these electronic messages were delivered at the same rate.
The “+” next to some aircraft IDs represents Datalink equipage. The messages sent to
aircraft equipped with Datalink were observed to be received and conﬁrmed within
approximately thirty seconds, whereas the latency of the messages sent to aircraft
without Datalink varies, as described in chapter 2. The controllers were observed to
have diﬀerent thresholds for the diﬀerent communication frequencies. One example
of this was observed when an aircraft without Datalink made a ﬂight level change
request near the border of the controller’s sector. The controller refused the request
and explained that when there are temporal constraints, such as approaching the
border of their sector, they will not make any unnecessary changes to aircraft without
Datalink.
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Figure 3-19: When an aircraft that is not certiﬁed for RNP-10 enters the Paciﬁc
tracks dedicated to RNP-10 aircraft, the controller must spend all their time ensuring
separation on the surrounding tracks.
Another unique aspect of operations over the Paciﬁc is that many of the tracks are
dedicated to aircraft certiﬁed for RNP-10. During observations, mixing separation
standards based on aircraft equipage within an airspace region was found to negate
some of the advantages of equipping. This was observed when aircraft without RNP-
10 used the dedicated tracks. RNP-10 aircraft have a reduced lateral separation of 50
nm, from 100 nm for aircraft that are not certiﬁed. To gain the eﬃciency beneﬁts of
the reduced separation, most tracks dedicated to RNP-10 were separated by 50 nm.
An aircraft that was not certiﬁed for RNP-10 requested to enter one of the RNP-10
tracks during the observations. The controller approved this request. The controller
then had to manually ensure separation on the surrounding tracks, as is illustrated in
Figure 3-19. Consequently, the controller was not able to address any pilot requests
or other non-critical situations, which decreased the quality of the service provided
to aircraft equipped with RNP-10.
3.8 Conclusions
Even though the aircraft in today’s oceanic environment mostly meet the current
equipage requirements the overall ﬁndings from the ﬁeld studies suggest that the
mixed equipage environment is limiting the control task. Variable communication
latencies were observed to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on controller planning. Findings
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show that workload increases when mixed equipage and performance-based separation
standards must be managed by the controller. Also, equipped aircraft may not achieve
the full advantages of equipping in a mixed equipage environment. As future equipage
is introduced, these problems will be exacerbated.
The current method of displaying equipage information on the ﬂight strip will
not be adaptable to the expected future technologies and there is not a clear way to
display an equipment failure, which may also become a problem in the future. Also,
the discrete ﬂight strip information and procedural control are not currently capable
of handling the nearly continuous information that ADS, or other high frequency
surveillance provides. Therefore high frequency surveillance information needs to be
displayed on a spatial situation display. As the observations show, there are issues of
trust and controller acceptance with the current situation display. Integrating high
frequency surveillance with pilot position reports needs to be addressed further before
implementation. This issues will be further studied through experimental analysis in
the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Cognitive Eﬀect of Mixed Equipage
4.1 Cognitive Model
A controller-centered cognitive model was developed based on a literature review
and ﬁeld observations. Previous human factors literature on situation awareness,
decision processes, and structure-based abstractions [18] provided the framework for
the model. The cognitive model is partly based on work by Endsley [19] and Pawlak
[20]. A job task analysis [21] and ﬁeld observations were used to gather a better
understanding of the tasks of oceanic controllers.
The air traﬃc controller cognitive model, shown in Figure 4-1, consists of three
states: Situation Awareness, Decision Processes, and Performance of Actions [18],
[22]. During Situation Awareness, a concept developed by Endsley [19], the controller
develops an understanding of the air traﬃc situation. First the incoming information
is physically perceived, usually by visual or aural means. The controller’s attention
limits which elements of the environment are perceived. Then, during comprehension,
the perceived data elements are integrated with the controllers goals. This is when
the controller begins to understand what has been perceived. This information is
fed into the controller mental model, which generates a projection of the current and
future states of the air traﬃc situation. Structure imposed on the ATC environment
(e.g., standard routes) create structure-based abstractions within the controller men-
tal model. These abstractions provide context for the situations, which makes them
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Figure 4-1: General cognitive model for air traﬃc controllers, partly based on work
by Endsley [19] and Pawlak [20].
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easier to understand.
Situation Awareness serves as the basis for the Decision Process. If the controller
does not develop adequate Situation Awareness, then he/she will not be equipped to
make the best decisions. During the Decision Process the controller ﬁrst monitors the
situation. To do this he/she compares the current and future state of the air traﬃc
situation to the expected states to see if there are any deviations. If there are not
any deviations, the controller continues to develop his/her Situation Awareness. If
there are deviations then the controller evaluates the situation to determine if the
deviations are within their threshold of acceptability. If the deviations are outside
this threshold, the controller plans an alternate solution which he/she uses to update
his/her “Current Plan”. The “Current Plan” is a dynamic, internal representation
of scheduled events and commands that will ensure the safety of the air traﬃc situa-
tion. Performance of Actions is dependent on the timing established during planning.
The implementation of the planned commands or events are executed through the
controller’s workstation, which was discussed in the previous chapter.
4.2 Impact of Mixed Equipage on the Cognitive
Model
When the observed operational impact of mixing information from multiple surveil-
lance sources and multiple communication modes and the application of various sepa-
ration minima is considered in the context of the cognitive model, further understand-
ing of the adaptation of the cognitive processes can be extracted. Since the onboard
CNS equipage limits the surveillance and command paths, the controller cognitive
processes are aﬀected by aircraft equipage. Hence, the impact of introducing addi-
tional levels of equipage on controller cognitive processes needs to be addressed.
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4.2.1 Control Inertia
The means for conducting surveillance and communication are two factors that con-
tribute to an aircraft’s control inertia. Control inertia is a concept that is deﬁned
as the representation of the perceived work required by the controller to modify an
aircraft route or trajectory from what is planned. The work required, i.e. inertia,
depends on the resistance to a change in the air traﬃc situation. More speciﬁcally,
the term work refers to process limitations as well as cognitive requirements. High
control inertia is caused by impediments in the cognitive processes of the controller
to develop a plan for modiﬁcations or impediments in the physical implementation
process. High control inertia results in reduced ﬂexibility in the ATC environment and
the need for increased separation to make up for the limited ability of the controller
to intervene in the air traﬃc situation.
The type of communication and its equivalent communication latency have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on control inertia because communicating a command is the only
means the controller has for modifying the aircraft route. Therefore, communica-
tion limitations result in an impediment in the implementation of a modiﬁcation.
Communication issues also inﬂuence control inertia for downstream changes. This
uncertainty in the ability to make a modiﬁcation in the situation at future time may
cause a controller to be more conservative in their present decisions. In general, longer
communication latency results in higher control inertia.
Surveillance and display limitations also eﬀect control inertia. The controller
uses displayed ﬂight information, which is partly based on surveillance, to produce a
picture of the current state and project the future state of the air traﬃc situation.
Therefore, cognitive compensation is necessary where there are issues with surveil-
lance or the display of the ﬂight information. In particular, the development of situa-
tion awareness becomes more diﬃcult with greater surveillance or display limitations.
Slower surveillance update rates and poor algorithms for projecting ﬂight information
displayed on the situation display are two examples of factors that currently limit con-
trol inertia. These limitations eﬀect the formulation of the plans for modiﬁcations, as
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well as the feedback loop for determining if the changes were correctly implemented.
Control inertia plays a role in the planning process. In oceanic ATC the planning
process consists of two functions, which are included in the generic functions that
are performed across a range of systems established by Endsley [23]. The ﬁrst is
to generate options or potential solutions, the second is to select an option or plan,
which then becomes the ”Current Plan.” The selection process is limited by the
control inertia of the aircraft involved. The controller does not always choose the
most optimal option, but rather the option that seems to be the safest. This typically
translates into minimizing the total control inertia.
There are many operational situations that are eﬀected by the role of control
inertia on the planning process. For example, if an aircraft has a high control inertia
and makes a time critical request the controller will not consider the request, even if a
change is possible. In the mixed equipage environment, this limitation on the planning
process reduces the advantages achieved by highly equipped aircraft. For instance,
if there is a conﬂict between an aircraft equipped with enhanced communication and
surveillance and an unequipped aircraft, the controller will be more likely to resolve
the conﬂict by maneuvering the equipped aircraft because it has a lower control
inertia. This solution is not optimal under most circumstances because it reduces the
beneﬁts achieved for the highly equipped aircraft by requiring the equipped aircraft
to deviate from the most direct route.
4.2.2 Cognitive Impact of Mixed Surveillance Equipage
Air traﬃc controllers determine the state of the air traﬃc situation through surveil-
lance. Limitations of the surveillance path not only aﬀect the control inertia, they
also increase the amount of uncertainty the controller has in their understanding of
the situation. Therefore the limitations should be minimized. Two potential limita-
tions identiﬁed through the cognitive model are the display of position information
with asynchronous update rates and inconsistency in the real update rate and the
display update rate.
In oceanic ATC, the surveillance update rate is once per hour. To compensate for
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this slow update rate tools have been developed to assist in the controllers’ projection.
This is done by extrapolating the aircraft path based on the ﬂight strip information
and displaying the continuous projection on a spatial display. This provides the
controller with misleading information. For example, when a new position update
is received, it can often be very diﬀerent from the displayed position and require
a sudden jump in the position of the aircraft target on the situation display. The
mismatch in the real surveillance update rate and the display update rate leads to a
lack of trust in the spatial display.
Fusing improved surveillance information with information provided by pilot posi-
tion reports needs to be addressed. Displaying asynchronous update rates can increase
the cognitive complexity of the situation for the controller. The combined display of
asynchronousisms complicate observability. The varying update rates are visually
distracting to the controller and thus they cannot easily perceive how the situation
is evolving. This will limit the controllers’ ability to project the future state. When
the controllers’ ability to project is limited, they may go into a less cooperative state
and prefer to not make any unnecessary changes because of the uncertainty.
The controller is hypothesized to take steps to reduce the uncertainty. Two options
have been identiﬁed as possible reactions to the mixed surveillance environment. The
ﬁrst is to treat all aircraft as if they were equipped with the slowest surveillance
update rate. This is the lowest common denominator eﬀect. The second reaction is
to establish cognitive strategies to reduce the amount of uncertainty in the situation.
Both of these options may be used at various times.
4.2.3 Cognitive Impact of Mixed Navigation and Separation
Standards
As navigation performance improves and pilots are able to more precisely deﬁne and
monitor their routes aircraft can be brought closer together. During the transition
aircraft not equipped with enhanced navigation will still require current separation
minima. Also, separation minima can be reduced based on improvements in commu-
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nication and surveillance, which will allow for more timely intervention by the con-
troller. Hence, aircraft equipage is a new attribute that controllers need to be aware
of during situation awareness in order to determine which separation standards to
apply. This attribute must then be considered during their decision process.
In the mixed equipage environment controllers will have to apply diﬀerent proce-
dures, such as separation minima, to aircraft with diﬀerent levels of equipage. In the
case of equipment failures the procedures applied to a single aircraft will also be var-
ied. When given multiple procedures, the controller is hypothesized to use the lowest
common denominator strategy and apply the worst case procedures to all aircraft to
ensure safety.
4.2.4 Trust
The issue of uncertainty was introduced in the discussion on control inertia. When
controller uncertainty is based on the tools given, their trust in the tools will degrade.
There were two speciﬁc trust issues identiﬁed. The ﬁrst is a general distrust of the
information. Oceanic situation displays are based on a model that uses limited input
information because the position reports are infrequently updated. This causes the
controllers to be generally skeptical of the situation display. Also, if the controllers
observe multiple inconsistencies in the displayed information and the real world, their
trust in the display degrades. As more frequently updated surveillance becomes avail-
able, the controllers’ trust in this new information may be limited if high and low
frequency surveillance are mixed in the same airspace region.
The second issue is a distrust of the conﬂict probes. Reduced separation due
to RVSM and radar is not currently included in conﬂict detection. This creates
numerous false alarms, which degrade controller trust in the conﬂict probes. In the
mixed equipage environment, separation standards will be signiﬁcantly evolving. In
order to maintain controller trust, reduced separation minima must be immediately
used to update the conﬂict probes.
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4.3 Conclusions
Overall, mixed equipage will have a major eﬀect on the controller cognitive processes.
Not only does the controller have a new attribute to be aware of and consider in their
decision processes, but varying surveillance frequencies and communication latencies
will aﬀect controller trust in the information displayed and aircraft performance.
These cognitive issues were studied further through experimentation. The results are
discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Studies
The number of surveillance updates within a given time period is deﬁned as surveil-
lance frequency. Fusing high frequency surveillance with low frequency surveillance
and varying the minimum separation between the two levels of equipage will introduce
a new oceanic ATC environment. This is currently experienced operationally on a
limited basis. Mixed oceanic and radar sectors experience a variation in surveillance
frequency. Also, in the South Paciﬁc aircraft that report their position over HF radio
are integrated with aircraft equipped with ADS-A. The cognitive implications for the
controller and resulting operational impacts in the mixed surveillance equipage envi-
ronment have not previously been studied. This experiment sought to determine how
controllers handle multiple surveillance update rates and varying separation minima.
5.1 Approach
The experiment performed consisted of participants monitoring and controlling air
traﬃc in accelerated time. The airspace and traﬃc ﬂow were modeled after oceanic
ATC. An example of the display used to complete these tasks is shown in Figure 5-6.
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Figure 5-1: ATC display used for experiments.
5.2 Objectives
The objectives were two-fold. First the experiment was designed to gather a better un-
derstanding of the cognitive implications of the mixed equipage environment. Specif-
ically controller workload, situation awareness, and trust were examined. The second
objective was to determine whether controllers would negate the beneﬁts achieved by
the highly equipped aircraft because of the limitations of the unequipped aircraft.
5.3 Variables
The independent variables for the ﬁrst experiment were the surveillance frequency
and the minimum separation. These were varied between aircraft equipped with
ADS (high frequency) and those that were unequipped (low frequency). The aircraft
target updated once per surveillance update, representing the known information
about the aircraft to the subject. The diﬀerence in the update rates was modeled
after the current oceanic environment where low frequency aircraft report their po-
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Scenario Equipage Type Surveillance Frequency Minimum Separation
1 High 1:12 20 nm
2 Low 5:60 50 nm
3 Mixed Mixed Mixed
Table 5.1: Three scenarios used in this experiment.
sition approximately once every hour and the high frequency aircraft reporting rate
is currently set at one report per ﬁve minutes [10]. The time scale was shortened
proportionally due to time constraints. The minimum separation was modeled after
those currently used in the Paciﬁc and those that are planned for the future [12].
The dependent variables were participants’ subjective assessment of the diﬃculty
of each scenario, situation awareness, controller trust in the position information,
and which aircraft the controller maneuvered during the mixed scenario. The con-
troller was hypothesized to maneuver the equipped aircraft when faced with a con-
ﬂict between an equipped and unequipped aircraft. In the mixed scenario, situation
awareness was expected decrease and diﬃculty was expected to increase.
5.4 Scenarios
The subjects were presented with three, ﬁve to seven minute scenarios, shown in Table
B.1. Scenario 1 consisted of only aircraft equipped with high frequency surveillance,
which had a surveillance frequency of 1 update per second (1 update/0.5 minutes) and
minimum separation of 20 nm. Scenario 2 consisted of only aircraft equipped with low
frequency surveillance (or unequipped aircraft), which had a surveillance frequency of
1 update per 30 seconds (1 update/15 simulated minutes) and minimum separation of
50 nm. Scenario 3 was the mixed case, in which 50% of the aircraft were equipped with
ADS and 50% were unequipped. The equipped and unequipped aircraft maintained
the separation minima appropriate for their surveillance frequency, as described for
the ﬁrst two scenarios.
For each of these scenarios there was moderate traﬃc and the airspace geometry
was varied, however the level of complexity was held constant. A primary geometry
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Figure 5-2: Example of the ﬁrst merging conﬂict used in the three scenarios. The
point of conﬂict is shown with a diamond.
was designed and then rotated or ﬂipped for the diﬀerent scenarios so that there
would not be a “training eﬀect.”
Four conﬂicts were designed or changed in a superﬁcial manner to maintain con-
sistency across the scenarios. The four conﬂicts were built into each of the three
scenarios in random order. Two merging conﬂicts between two aircraft, as shown in
Figure 5-2 and 5-3 and a head on conﬂict, shown in Figure 5-4 were included in each
scenario. The fourth conﬂict was more complex, involving four aircraft that were all
merging at one point. Two of the aircraft were on the same ﬂight level, another was
one ﬂight level above and the other was one ﬂight level below. Figure 5-5 demon-
strates this conﬂict. There were also three pilot requests, which were easy to medium
diﬃculty. The responses were not used in the analysis.
5.4.1 Participants
The participants were air traﬃc controller trainees. The experiment took place ap-
proximately three weeks prior to their full ATC certiﬁcation. A questionnaire was
administered to determine the level of the participants’ operational control experi-
ence. As part of their air traﬃc controller training, the participants controlled in
the actual ATC operational environment under the supervision of fully certiﬁed con-
trollers, for an average of 24 months (SD=0.899). Their experience was in Enroute
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Figure 5-3: Example of the second merging conﬂict used in the three scenarios. The
point of conﬂict is shown with a diamond.
Figure 5-4: Example of the head on conﬂict used in the three scenarios. The point of
conﬂict is shown with a diamond.
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Figure 5-5: Example of the fourth conﬂict used in the three scenarios. The point of
conﬂict is shown with a diamond.
Centers and Approach Centers (TRACON and Tower).
5.5 Air Traﬃc Control Simulator
A PC-based low ﬁdelity ATC simulator was developed for this experiment. The dis-
play, shown in Figure 5-6, is a spatial representation of air traﬃc, which simulates
generic oceanic airspace. The scale of the screen is 1 inch = 100 nm. The display
consists of aircraft targets (a small box with a tail extended to represent the direction
of ﬂight), data blocks, jet routes, and ﬁxes. A circle with a radius equal to the min-
imum separation surrounds each aircraft target. The circle can be removed during
the simulation by right clicking the aircraft icon. The datablock includes the aircraft
callsign, equipage information (ADS or non-ADS), altitude (ﬂight level), and speed
(Mach number). Each ﬁx is labeled with a ﬁx number to provide a means for the
subjects to issue relative commands, such as “climb to FL330 after F5”. The air-
craft position on the spatial display is updated once per surveillance update. In the
mixed equipage scenario, aircraft with diﬀerent surveillance types update at diﬀerent
frequencies.
Aircraft information can be changed by left clicking on the aircraft icon. When
this is done the route of the aircraft is highlighted and the information about the
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Figure 5-6: Low ﬁdelity ATC simulator designed at MIT and used for the experimental
analysis.
aircraft appears in the “Clearance Window”. Here, subjects can make changes to the
current ﬂight plan of an aircraft. Changes appear with the next refresh, except for
ﬂight level changes, which update at a rate of 950 feet per second. This is modeled
after the average climb rate of oceanic aircraft.
A trial run with ﬁve air traﬃc controller trainees was conducted prior to the
experimental runs to verify the simulator and collect comments on both the simulator
and the mixed equipage environment. Some of the functions of the simulator described
above were added based on the feedback from this trial run.
5.6 Procedures
Participants were individually brought into a conference room to run the experiment.
First, they received written instructions, included in Appendix B, explaining the
procedures, the simulator, high frequency and low frequency surveillance capabilities,
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and separation standards. They then performed a training scenario that consisted of
mixed equipage, three to four conﬂicts, and two pilot requests. The participants were
instructed to maintain speciﬁed separation standards and reply to pilot requests. The
three scenarios were administered in random order. During each of the scenarios there
were three pilot requests and four scripted conﬂicts. The participants completed a
diﬃculty rating following each of the scenarios and a post-experiment questionnaire
after completion of the three scenarios.
Following the experiment the controllers were given a presentation on the research
activities surrounding this experiment, including results from the ﬁeld studies and
modeling analysis. They were also given a handout with a description of the objectives
of the experiment. The handout is included in Appendix C.
5.7 Metrics and Data Analysis
Performance metrics included notes taken during the observations and a log of the
actions the subjects took. Subjective data was collected after each scenario and
following the completion of the experiment. A log records the change, aircraft ID, and
time of change. After each scenario, the subjects rated the diﬃculty of that scenario.
The post-experiment survey was used to gather further data. The survey can be
found in Appendix D. The post-experiment survey consisted of ratings, rankings,
and free response questions. Participants’ answers to the free response questions are
included in Appendix E.
Since there was a limited amount of time with each group of controllers and the
number of subjects needed to be maximized, the options for workload metrics were
limited. NASA-TLX, performance on a secondary task, and subjective assessment
of diﬃculty rating were all considered. The ﬁrst two options required a signiﬁcant
increase in the total experiment time, therefore the diﬃculty rating was chosen. The
subjects completed a post-scenario rating of the diﬃculty of each scenario. They also
completed a post-experiment survey ranking of the scenarios. Participants were also
given a free response space to justify the most and least diﬃcult scenarios. In order
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to learn more about controller workload the subjects were asked to state how many
aircraft they felt they could safely handle in each scenario after the completion of the
experiment.
Situation awareness is challenging to measure. Several methods were explored
and the performance-based testable response method was chosen because of its non-
intrusive nature. Subject performance and the time required for the subjects to
recognize and resolve the four planned conﬂicts was measured and compared across
the scenarios to gain insight on their situation awareness. The time a conﬂict was
recognized was an observable measure, deﬁned as the time at which the controller ﬁrst
looked at the pair in conﬂict or began to click on them. The simulator automatically
recorded all actions by the subject, therefore the time to resolve a conﬂict was ex-
tracted from the participant action data. During data analysis some of the subjects
reported diﬀerent strategies than others, which aﬀected their situation awareness.
This was analyzed further and will be discussed in the section 5.8.
Trust was measured through a conﬁdence rating. During the post-experiment
survey the subjects were asked to rate their conﬁdence in the position of aircraft with
high frequency surveillance and those with low frequency surveillance on an anchored
scale of 1 to 5. This data was used to gain a better understanding of how controller
trust is aﬀected by varying surveillance frequency.
In order to determine whether the aircraft equipped with high frequency surveil-
lance were receiving the full beneﬁts of equipping in the mixed scenario, the subjects
were asked which aircraft they were more likely to maneuver, aircraft with high or
low frequency surveillance, when resolving a conﬂict between the two. The subject
responses were compared to their performance during mixed conﬂicts.
Each of the dependent variables were analyzed using a one way ANOVA. The
ANOVA analysis was used to test the diﬀerence in the means of the three scenarios
for each of the dependent variables for statistical signiﬁcance, within an acceptable
amount of error. The α-value represents the acceptable amount of error. Typically
5% (0.05) or less is considered acceptable for signiﬁcance, this is the critical value that
was used for the analysis in this thesis. To further determine if there was a signiﬁcant
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diﬀerence in the means of the high frequency surveillance and mixed scenario pair
and the low frequency and mixed scenario pair analysis using the related-pairs t-test
was used. This t-test is commonly used to determine if the diﬀerence in the means
of two factors is truly diﬀerent or if the observed diﬀerence is coincidental. To do
this the amount of error in the data is estimated by computing the t-value, which is
then compared with the acceptable amount of error. Signiﬁcance is determined by
comparing the t-value to the table containing the critical points of the one-sided t-
distribution, which can be found in Appendix F. This table gives t-values for diﬀerent
degrees of freedom (df) and α-values. The df is equal to the number of participants
minus one, therefore the df used for the analysis is eight, unless otherwise stated.
Based on the Bonferroni correction, the critical α value used in the related-pairs t-
tests was .025 (.05/n, where n=2 for the two additional tests required). Therefore
t-values less than or equal to 2.306 are statistically signiﬁcant in this study, unless
otherwise stated.
5.8 Results
The analysis was organized into four parts. The ﬁrst part examined the subjective as-
sessment of the diﬃculty of each scenario by the participants. The second part of the
analysis examined participant situation awareness, based on the performance-based
testable response method. The third part of the analysis evaluated participant con-
ﬁdence in the position information. Finally, the fourth part of the analysis examined
participant bias towards equipped aircraft in the mixed scenario.
5.8.1 Scenario Diﬃculty
After each scenario, the subjects were asked to rate the diﬃculty of the scenario on
an anchored scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most diﬃcult. The results from the
rating showed a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of surveillance frequency, F(2, 8)=4.795,
p<.018. Using the related-pairs t-test, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence was identiﬁed between
the high frequency and mixed scenario pair, p<.003. The results can be seen in
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Figure 5-7: Results from the subjective assessment of diﬃculty for each of the three
scenarios. The mixed scenario and the scenario with low frequency surveillance were
both rated the most diﬃcult.
Figure 5-7. The mixed and non-ADS scenarios received the highest, or most diﬃcult
rating. There was not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the rating given to these two
scenarios. This implies that the addition of a partially equipped ﬂeet will not result
in a reduction in controller workload, compared with the current environment.
The post-experiment ranking of the diﬃculty of the three scenarios also revealed
a signiﬁcant eﬀect consistent with the post-scenario ranking, F(2, 8)=7.44, p<.004.
Six out of the nine subjects reported that the mixed scenario was the most diﬃcult.
The remaining three subjects found the scenario with low frequency surveillance to
be the most diﬃcult, as is shown in Figure 5-8. The “Easiest Scenario” chart shows
that six out of the nine subjects found the scenario with high frequency surveillance
to be the easiest. Two of them found the scenario with low frequency surveillance to
be the easiest and only one found the mixed scenario to be the easiest. The subject
that found the mixed scenario to be the easiest reported that he/she thought there
were less conﬂicts.
The ﬁnal test for workload was attained through asking the subjects how many
aircraft they felt they could safely handle in each scenario. An understanding of how
many aircraft can be safely handled is common in ATC since controllers, with the
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Figure 5-8: Results from the subjective ranking of the three scenarios.
High Frequency Low Frequency Mixed
High Frequency X 1.91 3.55
Low Frequency X X 2.03
Mixed X X X
Table 5.2: Results of the related-pairs t-test reveals a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
each of the three scenarios.
help of their supervisor, continually monitor their workload and ask for help when
they become overloaded. The participants were assumed to be comfortable handling
more aircraft when the scenario was less diﬃcult. A non-signiﬁcant trend was found
in the subject responses across the three scenarios, F(2, 8) = 3.207, p=.061, with the
mixed scenario having the least throughput. Figure 5-9 shows the results. The results
from the related-pairs t-test, shown in Table 5.2 revealed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the high frequency (M=11) and mixed cases (M=7.125), p<.005.
Overall, the three measures point to the same result, workload increases in an
environment with mixed equipage. At the very least workload will not improve from
an environment with low surveillance update rate to one with a ﬂeet partially equipped
with high frequency surveillance. This will have an impact on controller acceptance
of the incorporation of this new surveillance information and also airline motivation
to equip, since increased workload results in lower throughput. Increased workload
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Figure 5-9: The number of aircraft the subjects felt they could safely handle in each
scenario was used to gain additional insight on workload for the three scenarios.
According to the results, the mixed scenario yields the lowest eﬃciency.
can also lead to a decrease in safety.
5.8.2 Situation Awareness
Four scripted conﬂicts were included in each scenario. Participant response to these
situations was used to monitor situation awareness. There was a non-signiﬁcant
trend in the time to recognize the conﬂicts in the three scenarios, F(2, 8)=2.400,
p=.115. The pattern of increasing situation awareness was most clear between the
low frequency and mixed scenario pair, t=2.07, p=.039. The diﬀerence in the high
frequency and mixed scenarios was not as apparent, t=1.395, p=.102. There was not
a signiﬁcant trend evident in the time required to resolve the conﬂicts. Both of these
results can be seen in Figure 5-10. The subjects were asked to describe the strategies
they used in the mixed scenario. When their responses were examined there was an
anomaly. Two of the subjects (Subject 6 and 4b) reported that they applied strategies
that allowed them to project the aircraft route earlier to anticipate conﬂicts well in
advance. In other words, they increased their situation awareness. As expected, their
performance data reveals that they reduced the amount of time required to recognize
and resolve conﬂicts in the mixed scenario, as shown in Figure 5-11.
When Subject 6 and 4b are removed from the data the trend in the time to
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Figure 5-10: Results from the average time required for the subjects to recognize
(left) and resolve (right) the four conﬂicts.
Figure 5-11: The time required by Subject 6 and 4b to recognize and resolve the
conﬂicts increased in the mixed scenario because they applied a strategy to purposely
increase their situation awareness.
recognize and resolve conﬂicts becomes much more distinguishable, as can be seen in
Figure 5-12. There is a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the time required by the participants to
recognize conﬂicts, F(2, 6)=5.827, p<.015. This measure signiﬁcantly increased in the
mixed scenario, compared to both the scenarios with high frequency, p<.002, and low
frequency surveillance, p<.015. There is a non-signiﬁcant trend in the time required
to resolve conﬂicts, F(2,6)=2.398, p=.119. Both measures show that participant
situation awareness degraded in the mixed equipage scenario.
The ﬁnal measure of situation awareness was in the number of conﬂicts detected
and resolved. Figure 5-13 shows that there was an non-signiﬁcant increasing trend
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Figure 5-12: Results from the average time required by the subjects to recognize (left)
and resolve (right) the four conﬂicts, without Subject 6 and 4a. The trend becomes
more clear with these subjects removed from the sample.
Figure 5-13: Proportion of resolved and unresolved conﬂicts in each of the scenarios.
in the number of unresolved conﬂicts in the mixed scenario. The pattern was most
clear in unresolved conﬂicts between the mixed and high frequency scenario, p=.136.
Participants were expected to miss very few conﬂicts overall because safety is the main
focus of ATC and missed conﬂicts are in direct opposition to this goal. Therefore any
diﬀerences in the scenarios were expected to be small. The diﬀerence is predicted to
grow with more subjects, although a great number of subjects would be needed for
statistical signiﬁcance.
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Figure 5-14: Subject conﬁdence in aircraft position information rating for aircraft
equipped with high and low frequency surveillance.
5.8.3 Subject Conﬁdence
Subjective conﬁdence rating by the participants on an anchored scaler of 1 to 5
yielded the expected results. There was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of surveillance frequency on
conﬁdence, F(2,8)=21.951, p=.002. As shown in Figure 5-14, the subjects rated their
conﬁdence in the position of aircraft with high frequency surveillance much higher
than their conﬁdence in that of aircraft with low frequency surveillance. Controller
conﬁdence eﬀects the way controllers handle traﬃc. Since the participants had more
conﬁdence in the position of aircraft with high frequency surveillance, they were
hypothesized to be more likely to maneuver these aircraft when there was a conﬂict
with an aircraft with low frequency surveillance. This in turn reduces the eﬃciency of
the ﬂight for the aircraft equipped with high frequency surveillance. This was tested
further with the next part of the analysis.
5.8.4 Aircraft Maneuvered
During the post-experiment survey the participants were asked which aircraft they
were more likely to maneuver to resolve a mixed equipage conﬂict, aircraft equipped
with high frequency surveillance or aircraft equipped with low frequency surveillance.
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Figure 5-15: Performance results of the number of aircraft with high and low frequency
surveillance that were maneuvered to resolve the four mixed conﬂicts.
All nine of the participants reported that they were more likely to maneuver aircraft
with high frequency surveillance. This result matches their performance. A signiﬁcant
diﬀerence was found between the number of high frequency and low frequency aircraft
chosen to maneuver by they participants, F(1,8)=20.455, p<.0003. The number of
high frequency and low frequency aircraft that each participant chose to maneuver
to resolve the four conﬂicts in the mixed scenario is shown in Figure 5-15. Some
participants did not resolve all four conﬂicts because some of the conﬂicts were missed
or averted with a previous maneuver.
5.8.5 Strategy for Determining which Procedures to Apply
The issues of applying varying procedures was discussed in the previous chapter.
During this experiment this issue was examined further. The participants were found
to deal with the mixed procedures by eliminating the variations as much as possible.
One way they accomplished this was by maneuvering equipped aircraft when possible,
as described above. This method was eﬀective because the same procedures applied
to all equipped aircraft. Secondly, most subjects used vertical separation to resolve
conﬂicts. Vertical separation minima remained constant across all levels of equipage.
This was discovered through the subject response to Question 8: “How did you
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determine which procedures to apply when you were shown aircraft with high and
low frequency surveillance?” Seven out of nine of the subjects mentioned the use of
vertical separation in resolving mixed conﬂicts. The full responses can be seen in
Appendix E.
5.9 Conclusions
The data from this experiment proved the hypotheses to be true. The subjects found
the mixed scenario to be the most diﬃcult, their situation awareness decreased in the
mixed scenario, they had less conﬁdence in the position of the aircraft without ADS
and therefore chose to maneuver aircraft equipped with ADS when in conﬂict with
an unequipped aircraft. The following chapter discusses the implications of these
experimental results on oceanic ATC.
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Chapter 6
Implications for ATC Environment
Mixed equipage currently exists on a limited basis. CNS improvements planned for
the near future are going to exacerbate current problems experienced. Cognitive
issues were identiﬁed during the ﬁeld studies and further determined through the
experimental analysis. The experimental results show that cognitive limitations, such
as increased workload and decreased situation awareness, will compromise safety and
increase the potential for errors. Therefore serious consideration must be given to
the integration of CNS capabilities and reduced separation standards. If methods for
supporting the controller are not developed then the controller will continue using the
current control tasks, since they guarantee safety for the lowest equipage capabilities.
This will limit the evolution of oceanic ATC.
6.1 Phases of Implementation
The homogeneity of the oceanic ﬂeet can be used to guide the development of methods
for supporting the controller in the mixed equipage environment. The appropriate
approach will be dependent on the current transition phase. Three phases were
identiﬁed in this study. The ﬁrst is titled “early adopters”. This is when a small
portion of the ﬂeet is equipped. The second phase is titled “partially equipped”.
During this phase there is a split in equipage of the ﬂeet, with approximately 30% -
70% equipped. The ﬁnal mixed equipage phase is titled the “exception” phase. This
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is when most aircraft are equipped and only a few unequipped aircraft need to be
dealt with. These three phases are not independent. The oceanic environment can
be in diﬀerent phases for each of the three CNS components. An understanding of
the three phases can help in identifying solutions for the future.
6.2 Airspace Segregation Strategies
The experimental results presented reveals that controller workload increases, sit-
uation awareness degrades, and equipped aircraft do not receive the full beneﬁts
when varying surveillance update rates are combined in the same airspace. How-
ever, airspace segregation can be used to divide the airspace between varying levels
of equipage. The grouping of aircraft with similar CNS performance will provide a
structure-based abstraction for the controller. This cognitive mechanism will reduce
the complexity of the control task in the mixed equipage environment.
Airspace segregation is currently used to dedicate ﬂight levels for RVSM certiﬁed
aircraft and tracks for aircraft with an RNP-10 rating. The type of segregation
used should be based on the phase of implementation. Currently 98% of aircraft are
certiﬁed for RVSM and RNP-10, therefore we are in an “exception” phase. During
this phase the most desired airspace should be dedicated to highly equipped aircraft.
The airspace dedicated to unequipped aircraft can be minimized and pushed far from
the optimal airspace.
During an “early adopters” phase, diﬃculty will be experienced in providing full
beneﬁts to the equipped aircraft because the large portion of unequipped aircraft
must be serviced. Once a critical mass is reached and the air traﬃc situation reaches
the “partially equipped” phase a desired portion of the airspace can be carved out and
dedicated to the equipped aircraft. As more aircraft become equipped, the airspace
dedicated to equipped aircraft can grow and the unequipped aircraft can be pushed
further from the desired airspace. Once the “exception” phase is reached unequipped
aircraft can be pushed far enough away from the desired airspace that they are almost
excluded, as is done for non-RVSM aircraft.
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Figure 6-1: The three degrees of freedom for static segregation of airspace.
Strategies for segregation have been identiﬁed. There are four degrees of freedom
about which airspace can be segregated. They are the vertical, lateral, longitudinal,
and time axes. Vertical, lateral, and longitudinal separation can be used for static
segregation, which is most appropriate for the “partially equipped” and “exception”
phases. Time introduces a dynamic aspect of segregation. Therefore smaller areas
of airspace can be carved out for equipped aircraft. This is most appropriate during
the “early adopters” phase. The model for the three degrees of freedom for static
segregation is given in Figure 6-1.
6.2.1 Vertical Segregation
Segregation along the vertical axis is currently used for RVSM aircraft, allowing
only equipped aircraft between ﬂight levels 290 and 410, as illustrated in Figure 6-
2. Vertical segregation is used in other ATC domains for designating the direction
of ﬂight (e.g., odd ﬂight levels are dedicated to one direction and even the other).
Vertical segregation is limited though because it inhibits vertical ﬂexibility. Changes
in vertical position are currently used for resolving most oceanic conﬂicts, with other
aircraft, turbulent conditions, etc. This may change in the future environment when
separation standards are reduced, although training would be required to transition
out of this model of conﬂict resolution. Therefore vertical segregation needs careful
consideration before implementation.
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Figure 6-2: Static segregation of airspace along the vertical axis is currently used for
segregation of RVSM airspace.
6.2.2 Lateral Segregation
Lateral segregation is also currently used in the Paciﬁc. The most desired tracks are
dedicated to aircraft certiﬁed for RNP-10, as illustrated in Figure 6-3. The current
track structure in the oceanic environment is conducive to lateral segregation by track.
Ruigrok et al. proposed segregation of airways in the mixed ADS-B and non-ADS-
B environment [24]. The airways were proposed to be used for unequipped aircraft
only, allowing the equipped aircraft to ﬂy anywhere outside of this airway. Through
experimentation it was found that this approach is sensitive to the proportion of
equipped aircraft. Pilot workload increased as the proportion of equipped aircraft
increased. The eﬀects on the controller were not reported.
6.2.3 Segregated Maneuvering Zones
Airspace can also be segregated by designating lateral and longitudinal maneuvering
zones, as shown in Figure 6-4. In the maneuvering zone a higher level of performance
would be required and separation would be reduced. Areas of increased crossings and
mergings would beneﬁt from a reduction in separation minima. An analogy to this
type of segregation was observed at Reykjavik Center in the sectors with both traﬃc
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Figure 6-3: Static segregation of airspace along the lateral axis.
Figure 6-4: Airspace segregation by lateral and longitudinal maneuvering zones.
covered and not covered by radar. The longitudinal separation minima within the
radar coverage is reduced from 10 minutes to 3 minutes. It was observed that the
controllers manage most of the crossing and climbing traﬃc during the radar coverage
because of the increased ﬂexibility.
6.2.4 Dynamic Segregation
Dynamic segregation allows several highly equipped aircraft to be grouped together
and traverse the ocean with a bubble of protected airspace around the group. The
separation minima can be reduced within the group and the group should be given
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Figure 6-5: Dynamic segregation can allow for ADS-B equipped aircraft to be cogni-
tively grouped together and treated as a single aircraft.
the highest priority. During the “exception” phase dynamic segregation supplies the
opportunity to provide immediate beneﬁts to equipped aircraft without disrupting
the operations of the majority of the oceanic ﬂeet.
If the aircraft in the group are equipped with ADS-B, within group separation
responsibility can be transferred to the ﬂight deck. The controller can then maneuver
the group as if they are one aircraft. Figure 6-5 illustrates this concept within the
framework of the cognitive model introduced in chapter 4. In this example, the
grouping abstraction allows the six aircraft to be controlled as if there were two
aircraft. This segregation strategy is only feasible during the “early adopters” phase.
6.2.5 Incentivization
Providing incentives for equipping with the technologies discussed in this thesis is
critical to the evolution of the oceanic air transportation system. If the full advantages
are not attained, then aircraft will choose to not equip, which will produce a stalemate
84
in the transition. Therefore, future procedures should beneﬁt equipped aircraft, while
considering the phase of implementation so that all aircraft can be serviced. Airspace
segregation oﬀers an opportunity to accomplish this objective. In order to do so,
airspace segregation must dedicate the most desired airspace to fully equipped aircraft
and consider how the segregation will eﬀect the ﬂight of equipped aircraft. As shown
in the results from the experimental analysis, cognitive issues can limit the controllers
ability to grant the equipped aircraft full beneﬁts. Thus, human-centered systems
issues need to be taken into consideration when designing future procedures.
6.3 Display of Equipage Information
Since an increase in equipage variations can be expected in oceanic ATC, the controller
needs a clear way of distinguishing between the diﬀerent types of equipage. The
current letter indicator for displaying equipage information is limited. There is a
need to be ﬂexible to accommodate the new wave of technologies that are coming.
The current methods are not easily adaptable to these future technology changes or
equipment failures.
There are two approaches for displaying equipage information in the future: cen-
tralized and decentralized. The centralized approach groups the three CNS compo-
nents together on the display. The decentralized approach is to decouple the CNS
components and display each component near similar information. The decentral-
ized approach is planned for future U.S. and Iceland ground stations. For ATOP,
the surveillance information will be indicated by aircraft target symbology, Datalink
equipage will be indicated on the datablock, and navigation equipage will be indi-
cated by color-coding the altitude information on the datablock for anomalies (e.g.,
non-RVSM aircraft) [25].
A possible centralized approach had been developed based on the work presented
in this thesis. The proposed approach is a three character alpha-numeric-alpha code,
with each of the characters representing one of the CNS components, as shown in
Figure 6-6. The primary beneﬁts of the three character code is that it is adaptable
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Figure 6-6: A possible method for displaying equipage information in the future
environment.
to equipage changes because each of the CNS components can be independently
updated as the technologies evolve. The near-term expected equipage changes alone
motivate the need for ﬂexibility. The near-term possibilities for each of the three
values are shown in Figure 6-6. Another beneﬁt of the three character code is the
capability of dynamic adaptation during an equipment failure. An equipment failure
can be easily communicated to the controller by changing the CNS code appropriately,
and providing an alert such as changing the color of the code or ﬂashing the code,
depending on the severity of the failure.
The three character code can be placed either on the ﬂight strip or on the data-
block, depending on the primary display in the oceanic environment. For the current
workstation equipage information should be displayed on the ﬂight strip since the
spatial display is rarely used. The precedent for the location of equipage information
on the ﬂight strip has been established in the United States. Currently, equipage
information is displayed next to the aircraft type. Coupling the aircraft type and
equipage follows ecological design principles, which calls for the environmental fac-
tors that inﬂuence human decision making and actions be the driving force in design
[26]. In the future environment, if the spatial display becomes a primary tool for
oceanic controllers, the CNS code can be included as a third line on the datablock.
Consideration of the phase of implementation should be given when deciding be-
tween the distributed and centralized approaches. For example, during the “partially
equipped” phase the controller will need to monitor the equipage closely to determine
separation minima and ATC procedures. This may be easier to do using the central-
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ized three character CNS code. However, when most of the aircraft are equipped with
a certain level of equipage, in either an “early adopters” or “exception” phase, the
CNS components can be distributed and highlighted when there is an anomaly. This
can be done through changing the color of the information or some other alerting
scheme.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Mixed equipage is rapidly emerging in oceanic ATC. Datalink is used by approxi-
mately 30% of the oceanic ﬂeet and ADS-A surveillance reports will soon be accepted
by the United States oceanic facilities. These improvements have a considerable im-
pact on the control task. However, there have not previously been human-centered
systems studies on the eﬀects of combining aircraft with signiﬁcant variations in con-
trol inertia. This forces the responsibility of maintaining an acceptable level of safety
despite variations in control inertia and separation standards on the controller.
The ﬁndings presented in this thesis show that there are limitations to maintain-
ing an acceptable level of safety in mixed equipage environment. The experimental
analysis reveals that there is the risk of an increase in controller workload and a degra-
dation in situation awareness in the mixed equipage environment. Also, control inertia
was shown to eﬀect the controllers’ decision processes. During the planning process,
the controller attempts to minimize control inertia, which reduces the uncertainty in
modiﬁcations to their plan. In the mixed equipage environment this may translate
into maneuvering the aircraft equipped with the highest capabilities, which will limit
the increased ﬂexibility and eﬃciency that is expected with improved equipage. The
reduction in beneﬁts attained by equipped aircraft was also demonstrated during the
experimental study.
Issues of trust and controller acceptance will also limit the full integration of the
expected CNS improvements. Several examples of controller rejection of improved
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tools was given during the discussion of the ﬁeld studies. If enhanced CNS is not
utilized by the controllers, then aircraft operators will not receive a return on their
investment in the equipage and the evolution of oceanic ATC will be restrained.
In order to achieve the beneﬁts of improved CNS, careful consideration needs to
be given to the mixed equipage problem. Segregated operations are suggested as
a means of providing procedural support to the controller. The structure-based ab-
straction of grouping aircraft with similar CNS capabilities and dedicating airspace to
the groups will reduce the complexity of the mixed equipage problem. The strategies
used for segregation should be dependent on the phase of implementation, so that
the majority of the aircraft can be serviced and immediate beneﬁts can be granted to
highly equipped aircraft. Improvements in automation tools will also better support
the controller. As reductions in separation minima are introduced, the constraints in
the automation tools must be immediately updated to reﬂect the changes. If the sep-
aration standards are dynamically updated then the controllers will have more trust
in the conﬂict alerts and they will no longer need to manually monitor for conﬂicts,
which will reduce their workload. The methods for displaying equipage information
needs to be carefully considered so that the controllers have the information they
need at all times.
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Appendix A
Human Factors Studies on ADS-B
There have been various human factors studies on self separation using ADS-B, some-
times referred to as “Free Flight”. The role of the controller drastically changes in
such an environment. Rather than actively controlling the aircraft, the controller
passively monitors aircraft for separation conﬂicts [27].
Studies have shown that there are serious controller-centered concerns with un-
managed (self separating) traﬃc, especially during times of dense traﬃc. Corker,
Fleming, and Lane found that once 80% of the traﬃc are unmanaged workload sig-
niﬁcantly increased compared to 20% and 0% unmanaged scenario [28]. Metzger et
al. found that performance degrades when passively monitoring, as opposed to ac-
tively controlling [27]. Endsley also found that there was a decrement in controller
performance when pilots were allowed to deviate from their ﬁled ﬂight plan compared
to fully managed traﬃc. Ensldey’s studies also revealed an increase in workload and
a decrease in situation awareness for the controllers when pilots assumed some level
of separation responsibility [23].
The overwhelming theme in the literature is that the controller is not capable of
performing at the current level when passively monitoring. Most studies show that
there is an increase in controller workload and missed detections, and the time to
detection increases in a self separating environment. The primary source of cogni-
tive degradation when monitoring unmanaged traﬃc is the possible loss of Situation
Awareness. If Situation Awareness is not adequately developed then the controller
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will not be equipped to make decisions when necessary. When the controller is pulled
out-of-the-loop, he/she is no longer capable of detecting conﬂicts and instantly re-
sponding to critical situations. One of the limiting factors is the lack of pilot intent
information. In order to determine the reason for a pilot action the controller must
communicate to gather information about their intent. Endsley identiﬁed the need
for increased communications as a possible source of increased controller workload
in unmanaged situations [23]. Also structure inherent in ATC is removed in “Free
Flight” conditions, which increases the complexity of the traﬃc scenarios [18]. Devia-
tion from structure, such as a standard routing, is much easier to detect than random
deviations.
There is hope for the integration of ADS-B operations though. In an experiment
performed by the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) in Amsterdam pilots gave
the “Free Flight” scenario, in which all aircraft were equipped for self separation, a
high acceptability and safety rating [24]. This shows that self separation is feasible
from the pilots’ perspective. Further research needs to be done into the type of au-
tomation and the information requirements for the automation in order for acceptable
controller performance and workload.
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Appendix B
Preliminary Brieﬁng
Instructions:
You will view 3 traﬃc situations, which involve multiple aircraft. All aircraft are
Boeing 747-400s. The average climb rate is 950 feet/minute. The simulator time
scale is faster than real time, 1 observed second equals 30 actual seconds. This is
done so that a longer situation can be reduced to a reasonable amount of time. The
spatial scale of the screen is 1 inch = 100 nm. All traﬃc will follow standard routings,
designated by the lines that connect the ﬁxes. The actual route of the aircraft can
be viewed by making a left click of the mouse on top of the aircraft icon.
The surveillance update rate will vary between the scenarios and in one case
between the aircraft in a scenario. This is similar to the diﬀerence between the sur-
veillance update rate for radar and for pilot position reports. The surveillance update
rate will depend on whether the aircraft is equipped with Automatic Dependent Sur-
veillance (ADS). ADS is a form of satellite surveillance that is being incorporated into
oceanic ATC to provide higher frequency surveillance. For this experiment, aircraft
equipped with ADS will have an update rate of 1 update every 1 real second (or 30
simulation seconds) and aircraft not equipped with ADS will have an update rate of
1 update every 30 real seconds (or 900 simulation seconds - 15 minutes).
During the scenario aircraft will make requests and you need to decide what
response you will give and make this command verbally and digitally (you will be
shown how to do this). You can: grant the request, refuse the request, or give
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Equipage Surveillance Frequency Minimum Lateral Separation
non-ADS 30 observed s 50 nm
ADS 1 observed s 20 nm
Mixed mixed mixed
Table B.1: Three scenarios used in this experiment.
another command (the ﬁxes are numbered so that you can refer to them for other
commands if necessary). You must always ensure 1000 ft. vertical separation and
minimum lateral separation. The minimum lateral separation will depend on the
aircraft equipage:
You must also keep in mind that there are high costs for not granting requests in
oceanic ATC because of the fuel eﬃciencies. All requests made are for the route with
the lowest fuel burn.
There will be a circle around the aircraft with a radius equal to the minimum
lateral separation. If you would like to remove this circle you can do so by making a
right click of the mouse on top of the aircraft icon. There will be a datablock next to
the aircraft icons. The datablock will contain the following: aircraft ID, an indicator
of whether the aircraft is equipped with ADS (“ADS” if it is and “X” if it is not),
altitude, and speed. Below is an example of an equipped and unequipped aircraft:
Each scenario will take approximately 5 minutes. At the end of each scenario you
will be asked to rate the diﬃculty of the scenario. At the end of the 3 scenarios you
will be given a post-experiment survey.
Summary of Key Information:
• 1 inch = 100 nm
• 1 observed second = 30 actual seconds
• Left click of the mouse on an aircraft icon shows the route
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• Right click of the mouse on an aircraft icon removes the circle of minimum
separation
• ADS equipped aircraft: Surveillance Frequency: 1 update every 1 observed
second (or 30 actual seconds)& Minimum Separation: 20 nm
• Non ADS equipped aircraft: Surveillance Frequency: 1 update every 30
observed seconds (or 15 actual minutes)& Minimum Separation: 50 nm
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Appendix C
Debrieﬁng
This experiment was designed to understand how the frequency of aircraft surveillance
aﬀects controller decisions and whether it is more diﬃcult to control aircraft with
diﬀerent surveillance update rates. The post-experiment questions were designed
to probe the decisions further by understanding why the decision was made, what
strategies were used, and whether trust in the information about the aircraft was
aﬀected by the update rate.
There are plans to integrate Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS), which re-
ceives aircraft position directly using satellites, into the future oceanic environment.
This will increase the surveillance update rate from one hour (pilot position reports)
in the current environment to as low as 5 seconds (ADS) in the future environment.
However, not all aircraft will be equipped for ADS, therefore a mixed equipage envi-
ronment will exist. The current plans are for the controller to cognitively integrate
aircraft information with diﬀerent frequencies. But, there have not been any studies
to determine how the mixed equipage environment will aﬀect controller workload,
situation awareness, trust, and performance. Based on these and future experiments,
procedures and workstation displays can be designed to better support controllers in
the future oceanic environment.
If you wish for a copy of future publications resulting from your participation in
this research, please provide the information below:
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Name:
Email address:
If no email, provide postal mailing address:
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Appendix D
Post-Experiment Survey
1. Which scenario was the most diﬃcult?
2. Why was this scenario the most diﬃcult?
3. Which scenario was the easiest?
4. Why was this scenario the easiest?
5. Rate your conﬁdence in the position of the aircraft with high frequency
surveillance:
No conﬁdence Some signiﬁcant Generally conﬁdent Conﬁdent Very conﬁdent
at all concerns with some smaller concerns
1 2 3 4 5
6. Rate your conﬁdence in the position of the aircraft with low frequency
surveillance:
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No conﬁdence Some signiﬁcant Generally conﬁdent Conﬁdent Very conﬁdent
at all concerns with some smaller concerns
1 2 3 4 5
7. What was your strategy in the scenario in which you were shown aircraft
with both high and low frequency surveillance?
8. How did you determine which procedures to apply when you were shown
aircraft with high and low frequency surveillance?
9. When there was a conﬂict between an aircraft with high frequency and
an aircraft with low frequency, which aircraft were you more likely to
maneuver to resolve the conﬂict? Circle one.
Aircraft with Aircraft with
high frequency low frequency
10. Why do you prefer to maneuver aircraft with the type of frequency you
chose above?
11. How many aircraft did you feel you could safely control at one time in
each of the 3 scenarios of this experiment?
High Frequency aircraft Low Frequency aircraft Mixed aircraft equipage
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Appendix E
Subject Answers to Free Response
Survey Questions
Question 7: What was your strategy in the scenario in which you were
shown aircraft with both high and low frequency surveillance?
Subject 2: I imagined the future position of the aircraft with low frequency surveil-
lance while I was watching the other moving fast
Subject 4: Remembering the ﬂight level and path so when a new aircraft appeared
I could think: “he is at FL 310 and I know there is another one at FL 310”. So I’d
look each one and I remembered the path to see if there was a conﬂict or not.
Subject 5: I tried to guess the current position of non-ADS planes to ﬁnd conﬂict
points.
Subject 6: To anticipate movements of low frequency aircraft by showing the route
well in advance.
Subject 7: The strategy was to trust the position of high frequency aircraft and to
solve the problems with them ﬁrst, since we know immediately if they’re really climb-
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ing or not.
Subject 1b: I had to pay attention to the aircraft with low frequency suveillance be-
cause they were actually very fast whereas you don’t think so at the ﬁrst sight but
the circle moves rapidly.
Subject 2b: Vertical separation.
Subject 3b: To give instructions to the ADS aircraft.
Subject 4b: To anticipate a lot, mostly with the aircraft with low frequency surveil-
lance...to analyse their route ﬁrst.
Question 8: How did you determine which procedures to apply when you
were shown aircraft with high and low frequency surveillance?
Subject 2: It depends on their route and level. I watch the other planes and determine
which one is easier to maneuver.
Subject 4: When I have a conﬂict I immediately move the one with ADS so like
that I know nearly immediately that he has gone up so he is clear of the traﬃc. For
example, if I had 2 aircraft at FL 330, I’d give 360 to the one with ADS, so I could
see 360 nearly immediately so I knew he was 1000 feet above the non-ADS one.
Subject 5: I tried to get a diﬀerent FL for every aircraft.
Subject 6: Anticipate the conﬂict ﬁx, if there was one and act on the low frequency
aircraft ﬁrst.
Subject 7: I tried to apply vertical separation only and as early as possible.
102
Subject 1b: I think that in case of separation it’s easier to change the level of an air-
craft with high frequency surveillance because you are aware of its moving in real time.
Subject 2b: It’s easier with vertical separation.
Subject 3b: I was looking for the nearest Flight Level which was available.
Subject 4b: I was descending or climbing the low frequency if he had just updated or
the other one if not.
Question 10: Why do you prefer to manuever aircraft with the type of
frequency you chose above? (all chose aircraft with high frequency surveillance)
Subject 2: Because I can see clearly on my screen that the aircraft with high frequency
is at the assigned level to be sure that the separation is eﬀective.
Subject 4: no answer
Subject 5: It was quicker and easier to check the eﬀect of my clearance (more precise
feedback).
Subject 6: You can notice almost immediately that the ﬂight level changes, so you
get more conﬁdent.
Subject 7: You know immediately if your order has been followed or not.
Subject 1b: same answer as Question 8
Subject 2b: You can feel the ”movements” of the aircraft easier
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Subject 3b: To be sure of the position of the aircraft.
Subject 4b: Because I can see how he is climbing or descending and if he respect my
clearance or not.
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Appendix F
Critical Values of the t-distribution
Signiﬁcance for a one-tailed test
Degrees of α
freedom (df) .10 .05 .025
1 3.078 6.314 12.706
2 1.886 2.920 4.303
3 1.638 2.353 3.182
4 1.533 2.132 2.776
5 1.476 2.015 2.571
6 1.440 1.943 2.447
7 1.415 1.895 2.365
8 1.397 1.860 2.306
9 1.383 1.833 2.262
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